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I. INTRODUCTION
After more than seven years of negotiations and two major
postponements, the representatives of 108 countries and the European
Commission signed the Final Act of the Uruguay Round on April 15, 1994.'
This latest round of trade negotiations under the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade ("GATT") boasts a number of measures that should help liberalize
world trade significantly.2 Because of these measures, the Uruguay Round
has rightly been called a boon to freer trade.3
The failure of GATT negotiators to agree on the issue of trade in
audiovisual goods and services ("A/Vs"), however, represents a stark
omission from the list of the Uruguay Round's accomplishments. Despite
protracted deliberations, the United States and the European Union were
unable to agree on the rules that should govern A/V trade, which is now
worth four billion dollars annually between those two trading partners alone.4
The European Union argued that A/Vs are not like conventional goods and
thus pressed for the permissibility of A/V import quotas under the GATT.
This claim was in effect a demand for a GATT exception for cultural
industries.' The United States, on the other hand, appealed to GATT
principles and demanded either that there be free trade in A/Vs,6 or
alternatively, if quotas were to be permitted, that American A/V producers be
included as beneficiaries of national subsidy pools generated through levies on
1. Over 100 Nations Sign GATTAccord to Cut Barriers to World Trade, I I Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA)
No. 16, at 610 (Apr. 20, 1994).
2. For example, the Final Act lowers the customs duties of industrialized countries from 38% on
average to 3.9% on average. See GA7T. New World Trade Regime is Born Out of the Uruguay Round
Final Act, Multinational Service (European Information Service), May 10, 1994, available in LEXIS,
World Library, MULSRV File [hereinafter New World Trade Regime is Born]. Negotiators also agreed
to begin phasing out the Multi-Fiber Arrangement and to reintroduce textiles under GATT auspices starting
in 1995. See Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, Final Act Embodying the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations, GATT Doc. MTN/FA II-AlA-5 (Dec. 15, 1993). In addition, GATT negotiators
forged agreements with respect to trade in services and intellectual property built on many of the same
liberal trade principles underlying trade in goods under the existing GATT. See General Agreement on
Trade in Services, Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, GATT Doc. MTN/FA II-A lB (Dec. 15, 1993).
3. See, e.g., GATT Comes Right, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 18, 1993, at 13, 13-14; Uruguay Round
Agreement is Reached, 10 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 49, at 2103 (Dec. 15, 1993).
4. See David R. Sands, Clash of Cultures Creates Latest Block to World Trade Pact, WASH. TIMES,
Nov. 24, 1993, at B7.
5. See, e.g., E.C., U.S. Differences Remain on Audiovisuals; More Talks in GA7T Needed, EC
Official Says, 10 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 41, at 1777 (Oct. 20, 1993) [hereinafter Differences Remain
on Audiovisuals].
6. See, e.g., U.S. Urges Free Worldwide Trade in Movies, Radio Programs During Uruguay Round
Talks, 7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 36, at 1369 (Sept. 12, 1990) [hereinafter U.S. Urges Free Worldwide
Trade].
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film admissions and blank videotapes.7 With battle cries for cultural integrity
pitted against those for GATT integrity, the dispute over A/Vs evoked
impassioned responses8 and even threatened to derail the achievements of the
entire round of negotiations.9 The heart of the dispute appeared, on one level,
to involve different answers to three questions seemingly unique to A/Vs:
First, what are A/Vs, and how are they different from other goods and
services? Second, do these differences merit the exclusion of A/Vs from
customary free trade rules? Finally, should trade in cultural goods and
services be included in the GATT regime or any other multilateral trade
agreement?
On another level, however, these questions can be seen as part of a set
of basic policy issues that strike at the core of the GATT and its successor,
the World Trade Organization.'" This set of questions asks whether free trade
principles have any desirable limit. Although economic efficiency is important
enough to serve as a standard against which many trade policies should be
measured, other values, such as distributive and social justice, also rightly
compete for our attention. Cultural integrity could be one such value." Thus,
7. See, e.g., Aircraft Subsidies, Audiovisuals Remain Barriers to U.S.-E.C. Accord, 10 Int'l Trade
Rep. (BNA) No. 48, at 2038 (Dec. 8, 1993) [hereinafter Aircraft Subsidies].
8. For example, in defending the right of nations to protect their cultural integrity against American
AN imports, former French Culture Minister Jack Lang declared that "[t]he soul of France cannot be sold
for a few pieces of silver." Sands, supra note 4, at B7. Similarly, French film director Claude Berri told
the European Parliament in Strasbourg that "European culture is finished if the American [AV] invasion
is not turned back." Id. In contrast, Jack Valenti, the president of the Motion Picture Association of
America, characterized the A/V negotiations as having "nothing to do with culture, unless French
European soap operas and game shows are the equivalent of Moli~re." U.S. Industry, Members of
Congress Offer Mixed Reaction, But Most Back Accord, 10 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 49, at 2110 (Dec.
15, 1993). To Valenti and many others, the call for cultural protection in trade was "blatant protectionism
unmasked." Id. Even U.S. Trade Representative Mickey Kantor seemed to jump into the rhetorical fray
by publicly dismissing the European Union's last-minute compromise proposal as "a meaningless figleaf."
Negotiators Clear Path to GAIT Pact by Sweeping Away Remaining Differences, 10 Int'l Trade Rep.
(BNA) No. 49, at 2107 (Dec. 15, 1993). Furthermore, nationality did not always determine viewpoint.
Most notably, American film producer Steven Spielberg openly sided with the European Union's proposed
cultural exemption in the GATT. See Matthew Fraser, High Noon: U.S., Europe Ann Themselves for
Movie, T. V. Showdown Before GATTDeadline, THE GAZETTE (Montreal), Sept. 12, 1993, at B1.
9. See, e.g., Aircraft Subsidies, supra note 7, at 2038; Differences Remain on Audiovisuals, supra
note 5, at 1777; Foreign Ministers Fail to Agree on Position on Audiovisual Sector, 10 Int'l Trade Rep.
(BNA) No. 42, at 1811 (Oct. 27, 1993); Fraser, supra note 8, at B1; Uruguay Round Agreement is
Reached, supra note 3, at 2103.
10. If ratified by the governments of the GATT Contracting Parties ("CPs"), the WTO will officially
come into being in 1995. Unlike the provisional GATT regime, the WTO will not only sponsor all future
rounds of negotiations under the General Agreement, but will also be responsible for administering all
agreements made under the provisional GATT regime. See New World Order Trade Regime is Born, supra
note 2; Uruguay Round Agreement is Reached, supra note 3.
11. The tension between cultural values and free trade has spawned a diverse and growing body of
trade and law-related literature. There are a number of manuscripts, for example, that examine cultural
identity in the context of A/V trade. See, e.g., Richard Collins, The Screening of Jacques Tati:
Broadcasting and Cultural Identity in the European Connunity, 11 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 361
(1993); Wolfgang Hoffinann-Riem, National Identity and Cultural Values: Broadcasting Safeguards, 31
J. BROADCASTING & ELECTRONIC MEDIA 57 (1987); Kevin Robins & David Morley, Euroculture:
Communications, Community, and Identity in Europe, 11 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 387 (1993).
In 1989, the former European Community adopted a broadcast directive, popularly known as
"Television Without Frontiers," that called upon European broadcasters to reserve the majority of air time
for European works. Council Directive of 3 October 1989 on Coordination of Certain Provisions Laid
Down by Law, Regulation, or Administrative Action in Member States Concerning the Pursuit of
Television Broadcasting Activities, 89/552, 1989 0.3. (L298) 23 [hereinafter Directive]. Since then,
1995]
108 YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 20: 105
framed in the context of the A/V dispute, these more fundamental policy
questions ask whether free trade in A/Vs might lead to excessive social and
political uniformity or somehow unduly restrict the creative freedom of
societies to pursue their own goals.
1 2
The above questions are difficult and thus make the A/V dispute
interesting and significant. In short, these questions strike at our collective
understanding of the broad objectives - the vision - of the GATT.
Accordingly, this Article isolates the basic areas of contention and proposes
a conceptual framework for resolving the A/V trade dispute.
Part II discusses the development of the GATT and the historic tension
between its premises and A/V trade. The next three parts look at particular
dimensions of A/V trade that are commonly invoked as reasons for treating
A/Vs differently than other traded goods. Part III reflects upon special
economic qualities of A/Vs that have given rise to charges of dumping and to
a debate over whether A/Vs should be classified as goods or services for trade
policy purposes. Part IV looks at A/V trade practices and patterns,
particularly arguments about hegemony, unfair trade practices, and the
operation of comparative advantage in the A/V sector. Part V then speaks
directly to cultural and other non-economic concerns and their place in the
A/V dispute. Finally, Part VI suggests directions for international A/V trade
policy.
II. RISE OF THE A/V TRADE ISSUE
GATT Contracting Parties ("CPs") are not unfamiliar with the issue of
A/V trade. The original treaty, ratified in 1947, contains an article that singles
out motion pictures for special treatment. The first Section of this Part
discusses both the context in which the GATT and its Cinema Article were
adopted and the subsequent unsuccessful attempts by the United States to bring
several articles have discussed the applicability of the GATT to the Directive. See, e.g., Jon Filipek,
'Culture Quotas": The Trade Controversy over the European Community's Broadcast Directive, 28 STAN.
J. INT'L L. 323 (1991); Paul Presburger & Michael R. Tyler, Television Without Frontiers: Opportunity
and Debate Created by the New European Community Directive, 13 HASTINGS INT'L & COMp. L. REV.
495 (1990); Suzanne M. Schwartz, Television Without Frontiers?, 16 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 351
(1991); Clint N. Smith, International Trade in Television Programming and GAT: An Analysis of Why
the European Community's Local Program Requirement Violates the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, 10 INT'L TAX & Bus. LAW. 97 (1993) [hereinafter Smith, International Trade in Television
Programming]; Kelly L. Wilkins, Television Without Frontiers: An EEC Broadcasting Premiere, 14 B.C.
INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 195 (1991).
The use of "cultural exclusions" in trade agreements has also created debate in international
copyright law. See, e.g., Stacie I. Strong, Note, Banning the Cultural Exclusion: Free Trade and
Copyrighted Goods, 4 DuKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 93 (1993). The problems that new AIV technologies
pose for international trade policy in general are also beginning to receive mainstream attention. See, e.g.,
Keith Acheson & Christopher Maule, Trade Policy Responses to New Technology in the Film and
Television Industry, 23 J. WORLD TRADE 35 (1989).
12. See JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 28-29 (1969) [hereinafter
JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT]. Comments to this effect appear throughout the
popular literature. French President Francois Mitterand, for example, has asked, "[who can be blind today
to the threat of a world gradually invaded by an identical culture, Anglo-Saxon culture, under the cover
of economic liberalism?... Are the laws of money and technology about to achieve what the totalitarian
regimes failed to do?" Charles Bremner, Mitterand Enlists Old Empire in Linguistic Defence of Gaul, THE
TIMES (London), Oct. 19, 1993, at 11.
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television programming under the GATT. The latter two Sections document
A/V trade flows and describe current trade barriers, thereby setting the stage
for a discussion of A/V trade practices and advantages.
A. The GA7T
1. The Foundations of the GATT
Originally conceived as a temporary trade agreement to aid in the
establishment of the International Trade Organization, the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade 3 has become the most important international trade
agreement and institution in the postwar period. The GATT's general
objective is to ensure that its CPs conduct economic relations "with a view to
raising standards of living, ensuring full employment and a large and steady
growing volume of real income and effective demand, developing the full use
of the resources of the world and expanding the production and exchange of
goods .. . "14 To achieve this objective, CPs have committed themselves
to the liberalization of international trade through "substantial reduction of
tariffs and other barriers to trade and.., the elimination of discriminatory
treatment in international commerce.'
The perceived need for an institution like the GATT grew out of lessons
from painful international experiences. The first experience occurred in the
1920s and 1930s, when a number of countries pursued "beggar-thy-neighbor"
commercial policies that had devastating economic consequences. These
policies included quantitative trade restrictions, high tariff walls, exchange
rate manipulation, and other nationally self-interested trade restrictions that
caused chaos in international markets. 6 No less important were the
experiences during the two World Wars. By the post-World War II period,
domestic leaders in the United States and elsewhere began to see that purely
self-interested trade policies contributed to instability in international
relations. 17
Two powerful strands of thought emerged from this realization and
motivated initiatives that eventually led to the GATT."8 One was the desire
to harmonize and universalize the program of trade arrangements that the
13. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3, 55
U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT].
14. Id. at All.
15. Id.
16. See, e.g., JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT, supra note 12, at 9; see also
WILBUR F. MONROE, INTERNATIONAL TRADE POLICY IN TRANSITION 13-15 (1975) (noting desire for
freer, nondiscriminatory trade relations in response to "chaos" of 1930s).
17. The philosophy of former U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull, for example, echoed the
realization of many Americans that free trade not only encouraged, but was necessary for, peaceful
international development: "I have never faltered, and I never will falter, in my belief that enduring peace
and the welfare of the nations are indissolubly connected with friendliness, fairness, equality, and the
maximum practicable degree of freedom in international economic relations." Cordell Hull, Economic
Barriers to Peace, Address on the Occasion of the Presentation of the Woodrow Wilson Medal to the
Honorable Cordell Hull (April 5, 1937), in ECONOMIC BARRIERS TO PEACE 1, 14 (1937).
18. JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 31 (1989) [hereinafter JACKSON, WORLD
TRADING SYSTEM].
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United States had begun after enacting the 1934 Reciprocal Trade
Agreement.' 9 In fact, many of these trade arrangements "had clauses which
foreshadowed those currently in [the] GATT."2 The other strand of thought
was that because mistakes in economic policy could again lead to war,
countries should create international economic institutions that would prevent
such mistakes from happening again."
These two strands of thought mutually reinforced each other and produced
a set of basic premises shared by proponents of the GATT: (1) international
trade is beneficial (based on economic principles such as the theory of
comparative advantage); (2) self-interested national economic policies often
result in instability, rifts, and conflict in international relations; and (3)
multilateral consensus on policy is beneficial, and perhaps necessary, because
actions taken by individual states to advance stability through free trade are
often thwarted by the actions of other states.22 While some may question
these propositions, each is widely held today.'
The GATT furthers its goal of freer international trade with two
nondiscrimination principles that facilitate the exploitation of comparative
advantages.24 The most favored nation ("MFN") principle, codified in
Article I, requires that any GATT CP granting an advantage to any other
country must grant it to all CPs.' As a result, although reductions in tariff
rates, for example, are typically negotiated bilaterally, any agreed-upon
reductions benefit all CPs. The GATT in effect utilizes a multilateral approach
to reduce trade barriers. 26 The second principle, national treatment, is
codified in Article III and requires that imported goods, once past customs and
border procedures, be accorded the same treatment as goods of local origin
with respect to taxation and regulation.27
2. Cinema Films
Though drafted to liberalize world trade through generally applicable
rules, the GATT included among its original articles a set of provisions
19. Id. The U.S. Reciprocal Trade Agreements Program sought to liberalize the U.S. tariff structure
in order to facilitate the expansion of foreign trade and help free the United States from economic
depression. MONROE, supra note 16, at 10. It began with the 1934 Trade Agreements Act, which
contained two principles (among others) that were ultimately incorporated into the GATT. First, tariff
reductions conceded by the United States were to be given effect simultaneously with equivalent
concessions by other nations - that is, the concessions were to be reciprocal. Id. Second, any concession
granted by the United States to another country was to extend automatically to third countries, regardless
of whether those other countries were willing to offer the United States an equivalent concession in return.
Id. at 10-11. This principle was, and is still, known as "unconditional most favored nation." Id.
20. JACKSON, WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 18, at 31.
21. See id. at 20.
22. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT, supra note 12, at 9-10.
23. Id. at 10.
24. The GATT assumes that business entities conduct trade based on commercial considerations and
that comparative advantages encourage them to expand their international trade in order to gain the same
economic benefits that expanded domestic trade affords. Id. at 330.
25. GATT, supra note 13, art. I.
26. For a concise explanation of the origins of this bilateral-multilateral negotiation approach, see
KARIN KOCK, INTERNATIONAL TRADE POLICY AND THE GATT, 1947-1967, at 62-70 (1969).
27. See JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT, supra note 12, at 273.
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subjecting trade in motion pictures to special treatment. These provisions, set
out in Article IV, permit CPs to establish "screen quotas" to assure that a
guaranteed proportion of total motion picture screen time is dedicated to
exhibiting films of national origin.28 The GATT thus exempts motion
pictures from the general principle of nondiscrimination.29 Article IV(d) does
state, however, that screen quotas are "subject to negotiation for their
limitation, liberalization or elimination."" Article IV does not mention
television programs because trade in these was not significant at that time.3'
In any event, Article IV does not establish any upper limit on screen quotas;
theoretically, a CP may maintain a screen quota of one hundred percent for
films considered to be of national origin.32
Most commentators attribute the origins of the cinema exception more to
domestic cultural policies than to economics and trade.33 In the original
GATT negotiations, the United States pushed for the removal of all
restrictions on film trade.3' A number of other prospective CPs, however,
believed that tariffs would not be an effective means of protecting their
domestic film industries from foreign competition, and that quotas were
therefore necessary. 35 As discussed in greater detail in the next Section, the
United States ultimately conceded a cinema exception to the GATT based on
the belief that the financial incentives of cinema exhibitors would naturally
prevent significant screen quotas.36
3. Television Programming
In 1961, citing the introduction into international trade of a new
"commodity-television programme, either recorded on video tape or
photographed on film," 37 the United States sought assurance from GATT
CPs that exporters of television programs would receive fair access to the
28. Such quotas usually entail either a number of days reserved each year for nationally produced
films or a restriction on the number of foreign films screened. STEVEN S. WILDMAN & STEPHEN E.
SIWEK, INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN FILMS AND TELEVISION PROGRAMS 105 (1988). Article IV of the
GATT does not provide standards for determining the national origin of films. GATT, supra note 13, art.
IV.
29. GATT, supra note 13, art. III(10), explicitly exempts trade in motion pictures from the principle
of national treatment.
30. GATT, supra note 13, art. IV(d).
31. See Application of GAYTto International Trade in Television Programnnes: Report of the Working
Party, GATT Doc. L/1741, 10 (Mar. 13, 1962) [hereinafter Application of GATTto International Trade
in Television Programmes].
32. See GATT, supra note 13, art. IV; see also Application of GATT to International Television
Programmes, GATT Doc. L/1615 (Nov. 16, 1961) (communication from U.S. government).
33. See, e.g., JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT, supra note 12, at293. The ability
of governments to supplement their incomes with film revenues may have been an additional factor behind
the cinema exception. WILDMAN & SIWEK, supra note 19, at 136.
34. See IAN JARVIE, HOLLYWOOD'S OVERSEAS CAMPAIGN 251 (1992).
35. See Application of GATTto International Trade in Television Programmes, supra note 31, 8;
Filipek, supra note 11, at 339 (citing Matters Relating to Trade in Audiovisual Services: Note by the
Secretariat, GATT Doc. MTN.GNS/AUD/W/1 (Oct. 4, 1990) (unpublished document on file at GATT
Information and Media Relations Division in Geneva)).
36. See, e.g., Application of GAYTto International Trade in Television Programmes, supra note 31.
37. Id.
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television program markets of foreign countries.38 The United States noted
that the exhibition of television programs differed from that of films in an
important way. Governments, according to the U.S. argument, were naturally
constrained from imposing significant motion picture screen quotas because
commercial film exhibitors would want to show films - many of which
would be foreign films - that attracted large audiences and, hence, large
revenues. Most governments themselves, however, owned or controlled
television broadcasting facilities. As a result, many domestic markets for
television programs enjoyed only limited competitive bidding. In fact,
television programs were usually licensed in exchange for lump-sum payments
determined independently of the popularity of individual programs. The
United States contended that, under this system, the use of foreign programs
mattered less.3 9
The United States later argued that regulations limiting the ability to show
foreign television programs technically violated Article III's national treatment
principle.' The cinema exception in Article IV and the corresponding
exemption of cinema films from national treatment in Article Inl, the United
States maintained, did not apply to television programs. The argument was
that television programs are goods because the CPs found it necessary to write
a separate article relating to restrictions on showing films. Television
programs should not be treated like films, however, because many are
recorded on videotape, and Article IV's use of screen quotas clearly did not
apply to television programs. The United States did concede nonetheless that
while Article IV's cinema exception did not encompass television programs,
governments had understandably taken a special interest in television because
of its important role as a cultural and informational medium.4 '
A GATT Working Party was established in December 1961 in response
to the U.S. request for assurances of fair market access. The Working Party
was to examine the relationship between existing provisions of the GATT and
measures affecting international trade in television programs and decide
whether those existing provisions adequately dealt with the problem of market
access.4" The Working Party, however, failed to reach agreement on the
matter.43 Although several draft recommendations followed, the Working
38. Id.
39. Id. Some scholars argue forcefully that the continued lack of competitive demand structures in
many countries for ANs, especially television programs, negatively affects the competitiveness of those
countries' AN industries. See infra notes 114 and 115 and accompanying text.
40. Application of GA7Tto International Trade in Television Programmes: Statement by the United
States Representative, GATT Doc. L11646 (Nov. 21, 1961).
41. Id.
42. Working Party on Application of GATTto International Trade in Television Programmes, GATT
Doc. L/1686 (Dec. 18, 1961).
43. In the proceedings of the Working Party, the United States proposed that regulation of trade in
television programs be explicit, and that foreign programs be accorded reasonable access to domestic
markets. The Working Party, however, could not reach a consensus on the meaning of "reasonable."
Regardless, most CPs felt that any GATT decision concerning trade in television programs should await
further developments in the then rapidly changing technology. Application of GA7T to International Trade
in Television Programmes, supra note 31, 15.
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Party and the CPs as a whole took no final action.'
4. The GATT Uruguay Round Negotiations and A/Vs
For reasons unclear in the literature, GATT CPs apparently did not
formally address the issue of trade in television programming again until the
Uruguay Round talks began in 1986. To facilitate negotiations on the
establishment of a General Agreement on Trade in Services ("GATS"), a
Group of Negotiations on Services ("GNS") began work independently of the
Group of Negotiations on Goods ("GNG").4' The GNS later created an
Audio-Visual Sector Working Group ("A/V Working Group") to focus on
trade issues in that particular sector, especially issues pertaining to
broadcasting and films."
Although the Uruguay Round ultimately failed to produce an agreement
on trade in A/Vs, a brief look at the negotiations provides a convenient
summary of the issues in dispute. In short, several CPs, led by the European
Union, sought to include in the GATS a "cultural exception."47 These CPs
contended that the GATT regime should exempt trade in A/Vs, and possibly
other cultural items, from the GATT's core principles to permit countries to
protect and promote their cultural identities.4" The United States opposed the
exemption, noting that the cultural identity of A/Vs was increasingly difficult
to ascertain given the trend toward multinational productions.49
The draft agreement on trade in services produced by the GNS manifested
this lack of consensus. It included an exception for "cultural values," but the
words were bracketed to indicate the discord among the negotiators as to the
meaning of the exception."0
Despite this obvious disagreement, the United States, the European
Union, and other CPs continued to press for a services agreement
incorporating A/Vs until just days before the talks concluded. In the flurry of
negotiations immediately preceding the end of the Uruguay Round talks, the
scope of the disagreement appeared to narrow considerably to only a handful
of specific issues. A close examination of these issues shows, however, that
the strength of the underlying disagreement on the application of MFN and
national treatment to A/V trade prevented the brokering of a final accord.
44. See Application of GATT to International Trade in Television Progranunes: Proposal by the
Government of the United States, GATT Doc. L/2120 (Mar. 18, 1964); Application of GAYT to
International Trade in Television Programmes: Revised United States Draft Recommendation, GATT Doc.
L/1908 (Nov. 10, 1962).
45. Filipek, supra note 11, at 343.
46. Id.
47. The European Union's draft proposal for a services agreement explicitly exempted A/Vs from
both the MFN and national treatment principles. See Filipek, supra note I1, at 344.
48. See id.; U.S., Japan Block Uruguay Round Effort to Restrict Content of Audiovisual Services,
7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 40, at 1548 (Oct. 10, 1990).
49. See U.S. Urges Free Worldwide Trade, supra note 6, at 1369. The U.S. draft services proposal
apparently did not include a cultural exception or permit culture-based exceptions to the MFN or national
treatment principles. See Filipek, supra note 11, at 345.
50. Id. (citing Draft: Multilateral Framework For Trade in Services, GATT Doc. MTN.GNS/35,
art. XIV (July 23, 1990) (unpublished document on file at GATT Information and Media Relations
Division in Geneva)).
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First, the United States was willing to allow the European Union to
maintain its discriminating "Television Without Frontiers Directive,"" t but
only if the European Union made concessions on the subsidies issue.52 The
Directive requires that the majority of television broadcasts in the European
Union be of European origin as defined by the Directive.53 By consenting to
its use, the United States was clearly willing to exempt the Directive from the
general principle of MFN. In exchange for this concession on the issue of
quotas, the United States demanded that its producers benefit from European
A/V subsidies.54 The U.S. position stemmed from the insistence of many
governments on taxing videotape purchases and box-office revenues as a
means of subsidizing domestic film production. France, for example, places
levies on blank videotapes and imposes a twelve percent tax on all cinema
ticket purchases.55 The European Union, led by France, rejected the U.S.-
proposed compromise on subsidies, arguing that sharing the subsidies with
American A/V producers would defeat their purpose.
Second, supporters of "cultural specificity" in an A/V agreement
proposed a compromise in which reasonable market access could be written
into the agreement.56 The United States apparently entertained the idea of
including assurances of reasonable access but ultimately deemed the
proposition to be insufficient, especially in light of the European Union's
unwillingness to make concessions on the subsidies issue.57
Although last-minute negotiations - mainly between the United States
and the European Union - appeared to show some promise, the two sides
simply disagreed over the fundamental conception of rules governing trade in
A/Vs. The United States wanted the sector to be fully covered by the GATT
and subject to the same free trade principles that would regulate services
under the GATS. The European Union for its part insisted on an A/V
exemption or, at least, special treatment or "specificity" for the A/V sector
to enable countries to regulate A/V imports in the name of preserving cultural
identity. According to the European Union, because of the cultural content of
AVs, trade in A/Vs should not receive the same treatment as trade in other
goods or services.5"
B. International A/V Trade Flows
Even proponents of greater national control over cultural development
do not agree upon the scope of "cultural goods and services" or the "cultural
51. Directive, supra note 11, art. 4(1).
52. See Aircraft Subsidies, supra note 5, at 2038.
53. Directive, supra note 11, art. 4(1).
54. Aircraft Subsidies, supra note 7, at 2038.
55. Id.
56. See Brittan Indicates Commission Will Push for GATT Ratification by EU Parliament, 11 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 4, at 154 (Jan. 26, 1994).
57. See Uruguay Round Agreement is Reached, supra note 3, at 2103.
58. Differences Remain on Audiovisuals, supra note 5, at 1777. The United States and the European
Union could not even agree on whether the GATT's multilateral dispute settlement procedures cover
disputes regarding A/V trade. See EC, U.S. Aides Put Off Discussion on Intellectual Property, I Ilnt'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 3, at 93 (Jan. 19, 1994).
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industry. "" Most nonetheless share the belief that culture possesses certain
values that are inherently opposed to, and threatened by, commercial forces;
that the need for these values is universal; and that the market cannot satisfy
this need.6" Interpreted broadly, then, cultural industries could conceivably
include the commercial production of anything that affects values. GATT
negotiators favoring a cultural exemption or specificity allowance, however,
restricted their trade-related cultural concerns largely to films, television
programs, and videotape programs.6 Although the restriction is troublesome
in principle, massive trade imbalances that favor the United States in these
three sectors allegedly justify it.62
Because trade imbalances in A/Vs appear to significantly motivate cultural
concerns, this Section documents specific A/V trade flows. Three aspects
concerning data on A/V trade merit special attention. First, different measures
are necessary to evaluate A/V trade flows because of their public good
characteristics.63 If films and television programs were like standard
commodities such as steel or oil, economic theory would predict a correlation
among the quality of films imported, the size of domestic audiences, and
payments for these films.64 Public good characteristics weaken the
associations between these aspects of trade in A/Vs. Second, measuring A/V
trade flows can be an unusually inaccurate process, again due to public good
characteristics. Broadcast overspill and widespread A/V piracy, for example,
significantly affect measurement accuracy. Third, the data below assume
without critical analysis the "national origins" of A/Vs. Increasingly,
multinational business entities and individuals of different nationalities produce
films with international markets in mind. This fact makes determining the
"national origins" of many films somewhat capricious. More importantly, it
brings into question the reasonableness of using national origin as a proxy for
culture, as Part V demonstrates.
1. Trade Flows in Film
A study conducted by economists Wildman and Siwek65 and data from
UNESCO show that most countries produce relatively few films and import
most of the films viewed by their citizens. However, a few countries produce
59. See, e.g., UNESCO, CULTURAL INDUSTRIES 21(1982).
60. NICHOLAS GARNHAM, CAPITALISM AND COMMUNICATION 154 (1990).
61. Several delegations of the A/V Working Group, for example, regarded the A/V sector as
comprising the film, video, and television industries; including production, distribution, and diffusion.
Services - Audio-visual sector working group, NEWS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL
TRADE NEGOTIATIONS (Information and Media Relations Div. of the GATT, Geneva, Switz.), Oct. 9,
1990, at 11.
62. Available data show that lucrative trade flows in such items as books and pamphlets also favor
U.S. producers heavily. See UNESCO, 1993 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK, 10-3 to 10-6 (1993) [hereinafter
1993 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK]. Because books, music tapes, and the like are presumably also "cultural
goods," their exclusion from any special treatment accorded A/Vs would be arbitrary.
63. These characteristics differentiate A/Vs from conventional goods and services in other important
ways, as Part III discusses.
64. WILDMAN & SIWEK, supra note 28, at 13.
65. This Article relies heavily on WILDMAN & SIWEK, supra note 28, because it is one of the few,
if not only, recent and comprehensive studies of trade flows in film and television programs.
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many films. The United States is a prominent but by no means the leading
film producer. Countries producing more than 150 films in 1991 included
India (910), the United States (345), Hong Kong (239), Japan (239), Thailand
(194), and France (156).66
The nine major film-exporting nations are the United States, France,
Italy, India, the former Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, West Germany,
Japan, and Hong Kong.67 To give a more meaningful measure of the relative
importance of the United States among major film-exporting nations, the
Wildman-Siwek study used four indices.68 The first compared the number of
countries in which films from the primary exporting nations were distributed.
The United States (79) was first by a slim margin over Italy (71), the United
Kingdom (69), and France (68).69
The second index compared the number of countries in which the sales
of films from each of the primary exporting countries were number one. The
United States (56) outperformed all other countries in this category except the
USSR (10) and India (6) by a margin of at least ten to one. France, for
example, was a distant fourth, selling the most films in only five countries. 70
The third index analyzed the number of countries in which a primary
exporting country's films were among the top three sources of films. Once
again, the United States led (77), followed by Italy (39), France (36), and
India (23).7" As the authors of the study point out, the second and third
indices may be the best indicators of the international importance of U.S. film
suppliers as compared with those of the other major film-exporting states.72
Worldwide revenue shares also reflect the success of U.S. films in
individual foreign markets. In 1993, for example, the top one hundred
grossing films worldwide earned over eight billion dollars. Eighty-eight of
these films were considered American productions. 3
Furthermore, the dominance of U.S. films in foreign markets is
complemented by a blatant lack of penetration by foreign films in the U.S.
cinema market. Although large numbers of foreign films are released in the
United States each year,74 few attain prominent status at the box office. For
example, independent distributors in the United States released forty-four
foreign films in a twelve-month period between 1983 and 1984."s Of these,
only two earned more than one million dollars in the United States in 1984:
Les Compdres, a French film, and El Norte, a Spanish-language film. Both
66. 1993 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK, supra note 62, at 8-3 to 8-5. The UNESCO statistical tables do
not explain how the national origins of films were determined.
67. WILDMAN & SIWEK, supra note 28, at 16 (Table 22-2) (based on data compiled in late 1970s
and early 1980s).




72. Id. at 17.
73. Leonard Klady, Int'l Top 100 Earn $8 Bil, DAILY VARIETY, Jan. 4, 1994, at 1.
74. For instance, in a 12-month period between 1992 and 1993, independent distributors and classics
divisions released 77 foreign films in the United States. 1994 INTERNATIONAL MOTION PICTURE ALMANAC
437-38 (Barry Monush ed., 65th ed. 1994) [hereinafter 1994 INT'L MPAI.
75. VILDMAN & SIWEK, supra note 28, at 23 (citing 1985 INTERNATIONAL TELEVISION ALMANAC
313 (Richard Gertner ed., 1985)).
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used English subtitles.76
2. Trade Flows in Television Programs
Measuring trade flows in television programs represents an even greater
challenge than in films. As with films, the public good characteristics of
television programs necessitate looking at different measurements to describe
trade flows meaningfully. In the case of television programs, however,
transnational broadcasting and signal overspill present the additional difficulty
of properly identifying importing and exporting countries. Consider the
scenario in which French and Belgian audiences view the American television
series Dallas on a Luxembourg television station.' Has the series been
imported only by Luxembourg or by. France and Belgium as well, and if the
latter, have France and Belgium imported the series from Luxembourg or
from the United States?7" Furthermore, how would the determination of
importing and exporting countries be affected by the fact that the Luxembourg
television station sold commerical segments during the broadcast of Dallas
based on total viewership? 9
In spite of such measurement difficulties, U.S. television program
producers are clearly the largest supplier of imported television programming.
A study conducted in the 1970s, for example, revealed that the United States
exported approximately three times the number of television programming
hours each year as that of the next three leading export countries combined
(the United Kingdom, France, and West Germany).80 In marked contrast,
according to surveys conducted in 1973 and 1983, imports constituted only
one to two percent of the programs shown in the United States."1 As in film
trade, U.S. producers dominate trade in television programs.
3. Trade Flows in Videotape Programs
Although trade in videotape programs is not as well documented as trade
in films and television programs, available statistics and existing studies tell
a similar story about the role of American producers. The U.S. producers that
dominate trade in motion pictures dominate trade in videotapes as well
because motion pictures comprise a large portion of videotape rentals and
purchases. One study compared shares of U.S. cassette distributors with other
distributors in five European countries. The combined shares of U.S. cassette
distributors accounted for between forty and sixty percent of videocassette
rentals and sales in each of these five countries.8 2
In short, assertions that U.S. suppliers dominate A/V trade appear to be
76. Id.
77. See id. at 38-39.
78. See id. at 39.
79. Id. at 39.
80. TAPIo VARIS & KAARLE NORDENSTRENG, TELEVISION TRAFFIC - A ONE-WAY STREET 32-36
(1974).
81. Tapio Varis, The International Flow of Television Programs, in CURRENT ISSUES IN
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS 26, 28 (Table 1) (L. John Martin & Ray E. Hierbert eds., 1990).
82. WILDMAN & SIWEK, supra note 28, at 26, 30 (Table 2-14).
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true. The relative magnitudes of trade flows between countries have heavily
favored U.S. producers. Although systematic studies of trade flows in the last
five years are not yet available, recently reported statistics do not indicate any
significant break from past trade patterns. 3
C. A/V Trade Barriers
U.S. producers in the international A/V market have succeeded in spite
of a plethora of trade barriers. Indeed, the GATT explicitly sanctions one
trade barrier, screen quotas, as discussed earlier. This Section briefly explores
indirect trade barriers and some of the more common ways in which countries
have directly regulated A/V trade.
One of the most costly barriers to A/V trade is piracy." Recent
estimates place the annual loss to U.S. film producers from foreign piracy
between one and two billion dollars.85 Copyright enforcement problems
appear, of course, in all countries and markets. However, the lack of
copyright enforcement in some countries, such as Italy, Taiwan, and those in
Latin America, is particularly egregious."
Many countries impose quantitative restrictions. For example, the
European Union has recently passed and begun to implement a television
broadcast directive requiring each broadcaster to reserve more than half of all
air time for works of European origin.87 Private stations in Canada must
offer Canadian programming for a minimum of fifty percent of their broadcast
time.8 Spain recently passed a new bill requiring major U.S. studios to
distribute one Spanish film or EU film in its original undubbed version for
83. For example, in 1992 U.S. producers exported $3.7 billion of films, television programs, and
video programs to the European Union, an increase of $2.3 billion from 1987, whereas the European
Union's A/V exports to the United States amounted to only $300 million. Taking Cultural Exception, THE
ECONOMIST, Sept. 25, 1993, at 61. U.S. cinema films appear to be particularly successful in international
markets. According to one European document, U.S. films increased their market share in the European
Union from 60.2% to 71.75% and their market share in France from 36.8% to 58.7% between 1984 and
1991. Differences Remain on Audiovisuals, supra note 5, at 1777. American film, television, and video
industries earn approximately $18 billion annually - $8 billion of which comes from foreign markets. See
Company Town: U.S., France Agree to Seek Resolution of Film Dispute, L.A. TIMES, June 14, 1994, at
D4.
84. Intellectual property rights issues are significantly intertwined with the controversy regarding free
trade and cultural integrity, and a fill treatment of the triad is beyond the scope of this paper. For an
informative discussion on the relationship between copyright, free trade, and culture, see Strong, supra
note 11, at 106-11. For an illustration of piracy's magnitude, see Giovanna Grassi, Valenti Makes Case
Against Italian Pirates, HOLLYWOOD REP., Dec. 3, 1992, at 4; Robert Marich, Latin Pirates Under
Attack, HOLLYWOOD REP., Sept. 29, 1992, at 3.
85. The International Intellectual Property Alliance estimates that U.S. motion pictures accounted
for $1.02 billion of the estimated $4 billion in global intellectual copyright violations in 1991. Piracy
Wars: Skirnishes, Setbacks and Some Progress; Intellectual Copyright Violations, VIDEO MARKETING
NEWS, May 4, 1992, at 1, available in LEXIS, News Library. Other sources estimate annual film piracy
to be as high as $2 billion. See, e.g., James Cox, Bootlegging Billions: U.S. Loses Ground in Crackdown,
USA TODAY, Mar. 9, 1993, at lB.
86. In Italy, for instance, videotape sales and rentals generate some $300 million in revenues
annually although over $180 million is lost through piracy. 1994 INTERNATIONAL TELEVISION & VIDEO
ALMANAC 767 (Barry Monush ed., 39th ed. 1994) [hereinafter 1994 INT'L TVA].
87. Directive, supra note 11, art. 4(1).
88. WILDMAN & S1WEK, supra note 28, at 106.
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every two U.S. films released. 9
Import restrictions go even further to prevent the free flow of A/V trade.
Reports from Sri Lanka periodically note burdensome licensing arrangements
for English-language films, including outright prohibitions on imports.90
Indonesia completely bans the import and distribution of films by foreign
companies, while Pakistan, until recently, permitted importation of foreign
movies only through a national monopoly organization. 91
Many countries also subsidize domestic film industries, often through
box-office taxes. As mentioned earlier, the French government imposes a
twelve percent tax on cinema admissions as one way of funding its annual
subsidies to French movie producers. Such subsidies amounted to $245 million
in 1992.92 Norway's 1993 state film subsidies were more than $9 million'
93
While admission taxes are a common means of subsidizing domestic film
production, licensing fees, tax rebates, loans, and grants represent other
common methods of subsidization.
III. DISTINCTIVE ECONOMIC QUALITIES OF A/Vs
Before examining the different explanations and policy arguments that
have naturally arisen from the domination of A/V trade by U.S. producers,
one should consider at least two distinctive economic qualities9 4 of A/Vs.
First, as noted earlier, A/Vs have strong public good characteristics. Second,
A/Vs possess attributes resembling both conventional goods and services. This
Section shows that any set of rational trade rules governing A/Vs will have
to account appropriately for these qualities.
A. Public Good Aspects
1. A/Vs as Public Goods
Even if all GATT CPs agreed to include A/Vs in a free trade regime,
they would still have to account for what may be the most distinctive aspect
of A/Vs: their public good characteristics. Economists divide goods into two
types, private and public. 95 A pure private good is a good whose production
cost is directly related to the number of people who consume the good. 96
Once consumed by one person, this good is no longer available for anyone
89. 1994 INT'L MPA, supra note 74, at 734.
90. Id. at 735.
91. Bruce Stokes, Tinseltown Trade Wars, 23 NAT'L J. 432, 436 (1991).
92. Taking Cultural Exception, supra note 83, at 16.
93. 1994 INT'L MPA, supra note 74, at 733.
94. The term "economic qualities" is useful shorthand for those qualities of goods and services that
play standard roles in conventional economic analysis. It is used here to distinguish between those qualities
and the "cultural qualities" of A/Vs that have given rise to "non-economic objectives" in the A/V import
policies of many countries.
95. "Goods" here refers to both goods and services. Services were historically considered distinct
from goods and, to some extent, still are distinguished. The concept of a "public good," however,
implicates both categories. Note also that the words "private" and "public" have nothing to do with
whether a good is produced by a government; a government can produce both.
96. BRUCE M. OWEN & STEPHEN S. WILDMAN, VIDEO ECONOMICS 23 (1992).
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else to consume. A hamburger is a classic example of a pure private good.
A pure public good, in contrast, is a good whose consumption by one
person "leads to no subtraction from any other individual's consumption of
that good."97 More precisely, to be a pure public good, a good must satisfy
two conditions commonly referred to as non-excludability and nonrivalness.9"
Non-excludability means that consumption of a good is impossible to exclude,
or if exclusion is technically feasible, that it is too expensive to apply.
National defense is a typical example of a good that is non-excludable. A
good is nonrival in consumption when the marginal cost of adding another
person to consume the good is zero or close to zero.99 Examples of
nonrivalness (at least up to a capacity constraint) include a relatively empty
freeway or a park with empty benches. All non-excludable goods are also
nonrival, but not all nonrival goods are non-excludable. For instance, in the
nonrival empty freeway example above, use of simple and inexpensive
exclusion devices like a toll gate could exclude consumers.
As it turns out, "cultural goods" such as films, television programs,
music tapes, and books possess elements of both private and public goods. In
the language of economists, they tend to be excludable, nonrival goods. They
are excludable because they are normally provided in the form of a private
good such as a reel or tape. They are nonrival, however, because the marginal
cost of adding another viewer is generally very low relative to production
costs, and any capacity constraints are usually cheap to overcome.
In essence, "[t]heir content is a public good, but they are [often] delivered
to customers in the form of a private good."' I° To see more precisely how
their content is a public good, consider the process of production. In the cases
of both books and films, the production costs are almost exclusively confined
to the process of making the original copy. Once it is made, the replication
of the original entails comparatively little additional cost. Thus, the purchase
and consumption of a book or film by an individual does not really affect the
ability of someone else to consume the good. The story in a book, the special
effects in a movie, an author's writing style, and an actor's charisma are
public good elements of books and films.
While most goods possess a mix of private and public good characteristics
to some degree,'0 ' the relative importance of the public good characteristics
distinguishes cultural commodities such as A/Vs from other goods. For
example, television programs are almost pure public goods; 0 2 after a
television program is made, replication adds virtually no cost. Therefore, the
cost of production bears little relation to the number of people who could
watch the program. Furthermore, if the program is broadcast, the broadcast
97. C.V. BROWN & P.M. JACKSON, PUBLIC SECTOR ECONOMICS 27 (1978) (quoting economist Paul
Samuelson).
98. See id. at 27-34.
99. See id. at 28.
100. OWEN & WILDMAN, supra note 96, at 23.
101. The wearer of a pretty shirt, for instance, "consumes" it like a private good. People other than
the wearer, however, also "consume" the shirt to the extent that they too can appreciate its good looks
on the wearer.
102. BRUCE M. OWEN ET AL., TELEVISION ECONOMICS 16 (1974).
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itself is nonexcludable, at least within the area covered by the signal."0 3 Of
course, not all A/Vs possess the same degree of public good characteristics.
They all, however, possess sufficiently strong public good aspects to warrant
distinguishing them from other goods for policy purposes, as the following
Sections show.
2. Price Discrimination
Recognizing the strong public good aspects of A/Vs is important for at
least two reasons. The first involves the pricing of A/Vs. Because a private
good can only be consumed once, its price generally must cover at least the
combined cost of production and transportation. As a result, the price for the
same private good sold in different countries can vary only slightly. Profit-
motivated suppliers will quickly squeeze out any appreciable differences in
price by shifting the sale of the product from markets with comparatively low
prices to markets with comparatively high prices. With no trade barriers,
international trade in a private good will tend to equalize prices across nations
after accounting for differences in costs. 10
The relative importance of the public good characteristics of A/Vs
dramatically reduces the tendency for prices of A/Vs to equalize across
nations. Because the cost of replicating a film or television program (e.g.,
copying it onto videotape) is virtually nothing compared to the cost that went
into producing the first copy, owners of films and television programs have
no financial incentive to restrict sales in one country just because the film or
program sells at a higher price in another country. Once the producer covers
distribution costs, the sale of the film or program in each additional country
represents a net addition to total profits. 105
In fact, prices for A/Vs do vary dramatically across countries. According
to a survey conducted by Variety in the mid-1980s, prices for feature-length
U.S. films for television ranged from $90-150 in Bermuda to $30,000-40,000
in France."° Cinema admission costs in various countries also differ
substantially. In 1993, for instance, the average ticket price in the United
States was around $6 to $7, while it was $3 to $3.50 in Mexico.17
3. The Dumping Issue
The ability of A/V producers to price discriminate based on demand for
A/Vs in particular markets has created a great point of contention. Many
supporters of a cultural exemption or specificity allowance in the GATT argue
that after recovering costs in the large U.S. market, American film producers
103. Id.
104. WILDMAN & SIWEK, supra note 28, at 3.
105. Id. at 4.
106. Global Prices for TV Fiins, VARIETY, Apr. 23, 1986, at 58. A/V prices probably vary within
domestic markets as well. The variation is not likely to be as great as it is worldwide, however, because
per capita incomes, AN exhibition structures, and other factors affecting demand tend to be more uniform.
107. 1994 INT'L MPA, supra note 74, at 732.
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can and do "dump" their films in foreign markets.' In doing so, the
argument continues, American producers undercut foreign competitors in their
own markets and thus compete with an unfair advantage.
For nearly a century, international trade policy rules have condemned the
practice of dumping and permitted an importing nation to take certain
countermeasures, at least when dumped goods cause "material injury" to
competing industries in the importing country." 9 The GATT defines
dumping as the sale of products for export at a price less than normal value,
where normal value means roughly the price for which those same products
are sold for consumption in the exporting country."0 Where the margin of
the domestic price over the export sale price is greater than zero, dumping has
occurred. Although simply expressed, the formula for calculating dumping
margins is not simple to implement. Each variable in the equation involves
complex and often inexact calculations."'
Calculating dumping margins for A/Vs, such as films and television
programs, would face these same difficulties. Moreover, their public good
characteristics would further complicate the application of antidumping rules
to A/Vs. Recall that because of these characteristics, trade in A/Vs does not
lead to price equalization across national markets. Prices in different national
markets would be similar only to the unlikely extent that demand elasticities
are similar in those different countries. In the case of A/Vs, the "home market
sales price" will almost invariably differ from the "export sales price."
Determining what constitutes dumping in A/V trade is thus problematic.
112
A number of other considerations also complicate the application of
conventional notions of dumping to A/V trade. For example, a common
dumping argument claims that American A/V producers make money first in
the large U.S. market and then reap windfall profits from sales at low prices
in foreign markets. This view, however, artificially divides producer behavior
into two stages. Rational producers consider the entire potential market -
domestic and foreign - in making production decisions. This consideration
explains why someone would produce watches in Switzerland or grow Kiwi
fruits in New Zealand."' Similarly, if the size of a domestic market alone
determined export success, U.S. producers would presumably control most
world markets. They do not, however, because producers account for
international markets in their investment and production decisions.
Furthermore, strong arguments can be made to the effect that the "low
108. Variations on this argument appear in both academic and popular literature. See, e.g.,
Hoffraann-Riem, supra note 11, at 62-63 (explaining why U.S. broadcast producers are able to expand
into foreign markets); Presburger & Tyler, supra note 11, at 504 n.65; Panel Guests Examine the Pros
and Cons of GA7T(CNN television broadcast, Dec. 8, 1993), available in LEXIS, News Library; Sands,
supra note 4, at B7.
109. JACKSON, WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 18, at 221.
110. See GATT, supra note 13, art. VI(1).
111. See JACKSON, WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 18, at 231-36 (discussing determination
of "export price," "home market price," and "constructed price" in context of dumping). Indeed, some
argue that antidumping rules are so inherently difficult to apply fairly that they should be scrapped entirely,
not only from national laws but also from the GATT. See, e.g., James Bovard, Clinton's Dumping Could
Sink GAT, WALL ST. J., Dec. 9, 1993, at A16.
112. See Acheson & Maule, supra note 11, at 46.
113. ELI NOAM, TELEVISION IN EUROPE 15 (1991).
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prices" at which U.S. suppliers sell their A/Vs in foreign markets are less
indicative of conventional notions of dumping than of uncompetitive demand
structures in those foreign markets. Supporters of this view point to the
numerous cartel arrangements in Europe that prevent competition in demand
for A/V products and hence make rival bidding practically nonexistent." 4
This lack of bidding in turn supposedly keeps import prices lower than they
would be if competitive bidding existed." 5
4. Implications for International A/V Trade Policy
The above observations have potentially important implications for both
the GATT and international A/V trade policy. For example, the fact that
"dumping" of A/Vs occurs does not require their exemption from the GATT.
As discussed above, it is unclear how, if at all, conventional notions of
dumping apply to goods like films and television programs that possess strong
public good characteristics." 6
The public good characteristics of A/Vs nevertheless call into question the
applicability of free trade principles to A/V trade. Indeed, economic theory
demonstrates that the conditions for efficient allocation of a pure public and
pure private good differ considerably. Because supplying an existing public
good such as a film or a television program to an additional consumer costs
virtually nothing, excluding any consumer who values the good would be
inefficient." 7 Any uniform price is hence inefficient to the extent it prevents
the consumption of the good by consumers who attach to the good a positive
value below the uniform price.
Economic theory of efficient public good allocation demonstrates that
producers will not maintain the optimal level of output unless the marginal
cost of the public good is set equal to the sum of the prices consumers are
willing to pay for it."' This kind of calculation requires that the government
or some other entity determine the demand for the public good by each
consumer, collect payment from them all, and then distribute the money to the
producer of the public good. 1 9 Unfortunately, this economic theory does not
provide the institutional details of the political decisionmaking processes that
would be necessary to carry out this elaborate scheme. As a result, few, if
any, economists believe that the benefits of such a scheme would justify the
114. Id.
115. Noam argues powerfully that this lack of competitive demand in many countries is what ails
their AN industries, especially their public television systems. For instance, because "programs for which
American networks paid a million dollars were acquired only months later for large European audiences
at a price of only thousands and sometimes hundreds of dollars .... American producers, advertisers,
and audiences thus propped up the European public system." Id. at 20. For other arguments advanced by
Noam attacking claims that American A/V producers have inherent and unfair economic advantages over
other producers, see id. at 12-21.
116. If, however, the CPs could agree upon a dumping concept for A/Vs, they could incorporate
it into the GATT regime as a sector-specific provision and obviate the need for a complete exemption of
A/Vs from the GATT on account of "dumping" problems.
117. OWEN & WILDMAN, supra note 96, at 23-24.
118. John R. Woodbury, Comment, Welfare Analysis and the Video Marketplace, in VIDEO MEDIA
COMPETITION: REGULATION, ECONOMICS, AND TECHNOLOGY 274, 274 (Eli M. Noam ed., 1985).
119. Id.
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Economic theory nevertheless suggests two important considerations for
A/V trade policy. First, price discrimination and dumping in A/V trade are
not entirely inconsistent with efficiency notions. Although A/V suppliers may
not produce and distribute their goods in the precise way theory prescribes,
price discrimination by A/V suppliers in world markets is beneficial to the
extent that it reduces inefficiency. Thus, forcing American A/V producers to
sell their A/Vs at higher prices in foreign markets may protect domestic
producers in those markets, but it simultaneously represents a welfare loss to
those consumers who attach positive values to American A/V products above
the old prices, but below the new higher prices. Second, with respect to
markets for quasi-public goods such as films and television programs, strong
statements about the relative efficiency of alternative market and nonmarket
structures are inherently difficult to make. Thus, it is difficult if not
impossible to ascertain whether and to what extent the elimination or
imposition of "culture quotas" in trade would affect net welfare. This latter
point suggests that norms that are not strictly economic may be helpful in
deciding whether customary free trade rules should apply to A/V trade.'
B. The Goods/Services Distinction
Some scholars have attempted to justify the application of free trade rules
to A/Vs on grounds that they are more like goods than services and therefore
fall under the GATT regime.12 This Section demonstrates, however, that
while classification is important, the bipolar struggle to classify A/Vs strictly
as goods or as services tends to obscure more fundamental questions about the
treatment of A/Vs as public goods and the externalities to which trade in such
goods gives rise.
1. The Dual Nature of A/Vs
Distinguishing between goods and services can be difficult because no
precise and universally agreed-upon definition exists for either. In using the
terms "goods" and "services," people nevertheless usually have in mind some
general notion of their meanings. For example, three characteristics commonly
distinguish services from goods."z First, production and consumption must
be simultaneous in the case of services but not goods. Second, unlike goods,
services are impossible to store. Third, services are intangible, while goods
are tangible. 1
24
Although the above criteria work well in distinguishing activities like
haircutting from conventional goods, they have not proven very useful in
120. Id.
121. See infra part V.
122. See, e.g., Filipek, supra note 11, at 355-57; Smith, International Trade in Television
Programming, supra note 11, at 123-27.
123. See NIGEL GRIMWADE, INTERNATIONAL TRADE: NEW PATTERNS OF TRADE, PRODUCTION, AND
INVESTMENT 407 (1989).
124. See id.
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classifying A/Vs. Cinema films, broadcast television programs, and videotape
programs arguably possess attributes of both goods and services. All three,
on the one hand, are traded much like goods - usually in the form of a film
reel or videotape. On the other hand, the film reel or videotape acts only as
the means of delivering what was originally produced as a service. Treating
the live presentation of a play (clearly a service) differently than a videotape
recording of the same play would seem somewhat arbitrary and illogical.1"
This dual nature of A/Vs has prompted some to create distinctions within the
category of services. One thoughtful commentator, for example, characterizes
A/Vs as "splintered, or separated, services" because they involve services that
"have been splintered or separated from their original production in the sense
that they are now embodied in goods for separate sale. "126
2. The Underlying Issues
The curious aspect of the trade policy debate over whether to classify
A/Vs as goods or services is that classification alone does not address the
main substantive issues surrounding A/V trade. For example, the dumping
issue discussed earlier remains unchanged regardless of whether A/Vs are
labelled as goods or services. Furthermore, as discussed in Part V, cultural
concerns persist regardless of classification. The classification of A/Vs as
goods or services thus has limited relevance in resolving the initial question
of whether to subject A/Vs to customary free trade rules.
IV. A/V TRADE PRACTICES AND ADVANTAGES
The almost unidirectional flow of A/Vs from U.S. producers to the
markets of other countries has caused great concern among many GATT CPs.
Opponents of freer trade in A/Vs believe that this deluge of American A/V
imports threatens the cultural integrity of other countries. Although couched
in purely cultural terms, the arguments these opponents assert fall into two
distinct classes. The first class includes those arguments alleging unfair trade
practices on the part of U.S. producers and the U.S. government. One such
alleged practice is "dumping," discussed above. The second class includes
arguments about the way in which U.S. domination in A/Vs negatively affects
a particular country's cultural integrity.
This distinction is useful because the two classes of arguments are not
necessarily related for international trade policy purposes. As this part of the
Article demonstrates, the first class of arguments - concerning unfair trade
practices - points usefully to factors that may explain in part the rise of U.S.
domination in A/V trade. These factors are not, however, unique to A/V
trade. Hence, while they deserve attention and perhaps even an international
response, they do not themselves distinguish A/Vs from goods and services
125. For a more extended discussion of this point, see Application of GAYTto International Trade
in Television Programmes, supra note 3 1.
126. GRIMWADE, supra note 123, at 416 (citing Herbert G. Grubel, All Traded Services are
Embodied in Materials or People, 10 WORLD ECONOMY 319, 320 (1987)).
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that are subject to free trade rules. The second class of arguments poses a
direct challenge to the desirability of free trade in A/Vs and is explored
separately in Part V.
A. American Hegemony or Imperialism Arguments
1. The Commercialization of Media
Many proponents of a cultural exemption or specificity allowance in the
GATT justify their position as essential to combatting the imperialistic
tendencies of American A/V producers and the U.S. government. Although
this hegemonic or imperialist argument includes minor variations, it has two
key thrusts.
The first asserts that the commercialization of the U.S. media has led
U.S. multinational companies to seek and ensure their commercial interests
abroad in and through all media industries. Herbert Schiller, one of the most
prolific and representative exponents of this strand of the hegemonic
argument, writes that the United States alone among the advanced
industrialized nations in the pre-television era conducted radio broadcasting
in an unambiguously commercial fashion. 27 In Europe, for example, the
state typically owned broadcast stations. After the invention of television,
many nations increasingly began to look to the commercial broadcasting
structure of the United States as a model. Since then, even strong
industrialized nations have supposedly been overwhelmed by the influence and
ideology of profit-motivated American media and thus have been "forced" to
adopt commercial operations.
128
Dismissing the claim that commercial broadcasting is the most satisfactory
nethod of meeting the needs of the public, Schiller argues that "[n] othing less
than the viability of the American industrial economy itself is involved in the
movement toward international commercialization of broadcasting."1 29 More
specifically, "[t]he continuing and pressing requirements of United States
manufacturers to reach annually higher output levels to sustain and increase
profit margins activate the process that is relentlessly enveloping electronic
(and other) communications in a sheath of commercialization."' 30 Schiller
even goes so far as to claim that the U.S. government and American
multinational corporations deploy First Amendment values in order to mask
127. HERBERT SCHILLER, MASS COMMUNICATIONS AND AMERICAN EMPIRE 138 (1969) (citing
Satellite Communications, 1964 (part 2): Hearings Before the Comn. on Gov't. Operations, 88th Cong.,
2d Sess. 660 (1964) (testimony of William Gilbert Carter)). This paper draws heavily from Schiller's book
in explicating the basic theses of the American hegemony paradigm because his work is considered the
earliest and most influential in the modern strain of this paradigm. For other works representative of the
paradigm, see BEYOND NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY: INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS IN THE 1990S
(Kaarle Nordenstreng & Herbert I. Schiller eds., 1993) [hereinafter BEYOND NATIONAL SOVEREIONTY];
ANTHONY D. SMITH, THE GEOPOLITICS OF INFORMATION (1980) [hereinafter SMITH, GEOPOLrrIcs];
JEREMY TUNSTALL, THE MEDIA ARE AMERICAN (1977).
128. SCHILLER, supra note 127, at 95.
129. Id. (emphasis omitted).
130. Id.
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efforts to dominate the world commercially."'
The term "American multinational corporations" in this sense refers to
U.S. producers of consumer goods and A/Vs. The fundamental driving forces
of the commercialization of media are thus consumer goods, advertising
industries, and A/Vs themselves. The result, according to Schiller, is "the
propagation and extension of the American business system and its values to
all corners of the international community." 132 Furthermore, powerful
American companies supposedly marshall their influence to overwhelm state-
controlled media structures. The human cost is the emergence of homo
consumens, a person whose need for mass consumption is stimulated and
manipulated by largely U.S. commercial and advertising interests.
133
U.S. trade in motion pictures and television programming is an integral
part of this aspect of the hegemony argument. As with U.S. producers of
other goods, American A/V producers also seek profit in foreign markets.
Equity investment in facilities offers direct outlets to U.S. broadcast
companies. However, the largest revenues come from the export of U.S.
programming. 134 The U.S. film industry, under Schiller's formulation, is
even more advanced in its global expansion. 3 5
2. U.S. Government-Industry Alliance
The second part of the hegemony argument maintains that the U.S.
government has used its hegemonic powers to help American A/V producers
secure foreign markets for U.S. products and ideas. This argument directly
challenges the notion that American A/V producers have been "merely the
passive recipient[s] of the good fortune of historical circumstances and
economic laws."' 3 6 To be sure, the rise of the top film producers (the
"majors") in the United States is interesting and controversial. 137 This
Article will focus on specific events in their development that proponents of
the American hegemony paradigm cite as particularly relevant to international
A/V trade policy.
World War I represented a dramatic turning point for the United States
and its film producers because the war transformed the United States from a
131. See ROBERT L. STEVENSON, GLOBAL COMMUNICATIONS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 141
(1994).
132. SCHILLER, supra note 127, at 92.
133. Id. at 98 (quoting Erich Fromm, The Psychological Aspects of the Guaranteed Income, in THE
GUARANTEED INCOME 179 (Robert Theobold ed., 1966)).
134. Id. at 85.
135. Id. at 91.
136. Thomas Guback, Non-Market Factors in the International Distribution of American Films, in
I CURRENT RESEARCH IN FILM: AUDIENCES, ECONOMICS, AND LAW 111, 113 (Bruce A. Austin ed.,
1985) [hereinafter Guback, Non-Market Factors].
137. See generally THE AMERICAN FILM INDUSTRY- (Tino Balio ed., 1976) (surveying effects of
economics, changing legal restraints, technological advances, financing, and distribution trade practices
on history of American film industry); THE AMERICAN MOVIE INDUSTRY (Gorham Kindem ed., 1982)
(surveying history of American movie industry from business, law, mass communications, and film
perspectives); SUZANNE MARY DONAHUE, AMERICAN FILM DISTRIBUTION (1987).
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debtor to a creditor nation.'38 The war basically redirected capital flows.
For instance, U.S. capital went to war-damaged countries in Europe, while
European capital went to the war fronts. The American film industry was,
among other U.S. industries, a beneficiary of the war and the resulting stark
changes in capital markets. War devastation seriously disrupted European film
industries or forced them out of international markets.' U.S. film
producers filled the vacuum, as a brief look at changes in film trade flows
between the United States and the rest of the world confirms: During 1913,
the last year before World War I, the United States exported 32 million feet
of motion pictures. Twelve years later, the total reached 235 million feet.
American film exports to Europe increased by five hundred percent during
these dozen years, while the industry's development of markets in the Far
East, Latin America, and Africa spurred a tenfold growth in U.S.
exports." Before long, the mobile inputs of film production - creative
personnel and film financing - began shifting across national boundaries,
from countries with less favorable conditions to those with more. Hollywood
became a focus for this movement and thereby attracted film professionals
from around the world. '41
Besides profiting from the war-disrupted film markets of foreign
countries, American film producers also benefited significantly from
practicing price discrimination in foreign markets and from the cooperation
of the U.S. government in assuring open film markets abroad. The
significance of the former is set out in Part III.A.2 above; the latter
constitutes one of the key arguments that proponents of the hegemonic
paradigm advance to explain the domination of American A/V producers
today. American A/V producers and the U.S. government share a richly
documented history of cooperation with respect to foreign trade barriers. By
the 1920s, many countries had already noticed that Hollywood products
accounted for approximately four fifths of all film screenings in the
world. 42 The concerns of these foreign countries fell into two categories.
First, the popularity of American pictures not only monopolized exhibition
time, but also created greater financial risks for locally-made films.'43 As
a result, local filmmakers produced fewer films. Furthermore, some thought
that film persuasively glamorized certain traits and ideals that clashed with
those of local populations.'" Because of these concerns, countries with
major cinema markets began to curtail the import of U.S. films.' 45 In short,
138. Thomas Guback, Hollywood's International Market, in THE AMERICAN FILM INDUSTRY, supra
note 137, at 388.
139. See ROBERT SKLAR, FILM: AN INTERNATIONAL HISTORY OF THE MEDIUM 75 (1993); see also
KRISTIN THOMPSON, EXPORTING ENTERTAINMENT 61-99 (1985) (analyzing expansion of American film
industry into foreign markets as result of World War I).
140. SKLAR, supra note 139.
141. See id. at 95. The ability of Hollywood to attract film talent from around the world undoubtedly
has enhanced its ability to produce video products with transnational appeal. For further discussion of the
transnational appeal of American A/Vs, see Section C of this Part.
142. SMITH, GEOPOLITICS, supra note 127, at 41.
143. Guback, Hollywood's International Market, supra note 138, at 392.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 392-93. In 1921 Germany, which had strongly supported domestic film production,
became the first state to limit film imports legislatively. SKLAR, supra note 139, at 95.
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the deluge of post-war American movie exports created a backlash in many
markets, leading governments to set protectionist quotas designed to shelter
their own film industries.' 4'
The new barriers prompted Hollywood to solicit the help of the U.S.
government. In the 1920s, the State Department intervened on behalf of the
U.S. film industry in France, Spain, Italy, Germany, Austria, Hungary, and
Czechoslovakia by emphasizing the need for freer trade so that investment and
other economic decisions would be less risky. 47 The United States and its
producers were quick to point out that the United States did not restrict the
importation of foreign films into the United States.
Besides noting that the U.S. government has sought to keep foreign
markets open for business reasons, advocates of the cultural imperialism
paradigm point emphatically to the ideological reasons behind the
government's promotion of U.S. film exports. Indeed, evidence supports the
proposition that the U.S. government considered the dissemination of U.S.
films abroad as a means of spreading American ideals to areas destabilized by
World War II. Many U.S. officials apparently believed that, with the end of
Nazi control in Western Europe, the "fluid political climate... offer[ed] the
Left an opportunity to win popular support and to come to political power
. ... ""s This belief led to "an intensive campaign . . . to thwart such a
political tendency" by "all means of official and private communications" -
including American films.' 49 Promoted by the Bureau of Psychological
Warfare, American films followed in the wake of American troops.50 In
addition, to fight the spread of communism in Europe - and in Italy in
particular - President Truman secretly supported propaganda schemes that
included the promotion of U.S. film exports.' 5'
3. Evaluation of the Hegemonic Paradigm
Hegemonic explanations of U.S. domination aid analysis of A/V trade
issues in at least two ways. First, until recently mainstream trade policy
literature has paid little attention to the history of A/V industries and trade.
Existing research shows that an evaluation of A/V market operations in the
United States and international markets must account for nonmarket factors.
Second, politico-economic explanations can capture many significant historical
factors that have disproportionately benefitted certain producer groups and not
others. For instance, the collapse of film industries in Europe and elsewhere
after the World Wars almost certainly made it easier for U.S. producers to
export A/Vs.'52
Yet, without providing further analysis, hegemonic explanations and
arguments do not serve as persuasive rationales for particular trade law
146. Guback, Hollywood's International Market, supra note 138, at 393.
147. Id.
148. Guback, Non-Market Factors, supra note 136, at 116.
149. Id.
150. Guback, Hollywood's International Market, supra note 138, at 395.
151. State Department documents confirm President Truman's support. Id. at 396.
152. See supra notes 139 and 140 and accompanying text.
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reform, much less a particular trade regime. For example, the argument that
the United States led countries to commercialize broadcasting and other A/V
industries contributes little to answering the question of what policies an
international A/V trade regime should include. Schiller's and others'
interpretations of American domination in A/Vs do not include well specified
criteria for measuring well-being. Without specific standards, the hegemonic
paradigm has difficulty showing that the current A/V trade regime, or an even
less globally regulated system, is inferior to an alternative regime.
In addition, many of the political and historical events cited by proponents
of the hegemony argument have limited relevance for trade policy. For
example, U.S. film producers enjoyed a significant "head start" in the
industry. They benefitted from the disruption the World Wars caused in
foreign A/V markets and from U.S. foreign policy during the middle of this
century. In addition, they invented the feature film, which gained popular
acceptance worldwide. Focusing on these examples contributes to our
understanding of the American A/V industry's international growth but, again,
says little about what the rules of A/V trade should be. 53 These historical
and political factors thus do not require advocating a cultural exemption or
specificity allowance in the GATT; in fact, they ironically suggest the
opposite. Assume, for instance, that the GATT legitimized the privilege of
governments to regulate A/V imports. If the above example of the U.S.
government-industry alliance is taken seriously, it seems only right to assume
that governments with such a privilege would exploit it to protect and promote
economic and ideological interests at home for the very same reasons the U.S.
government has allegedly sought to do so abroad. This part of the hegemonic
paradigm actually argues against governmental privileges, not for them.
154
Finally, the hegemonic paradigm is questionable on its own terms. For
example, foreign countries certainly did not have to emulate the United States
in its commercialization of the media. Little suggests that advanced industrial
states like France and Germany did not, and do not, have the ability to
formulate policies more consistent with their best interests. These two states
have frequently adopted policies in other arenas at odds with U.S.
interests. 55 Indeed, recently strengthened film and television import barriers
153. Recent work in economic theory suggests that, where certain conditions are met, "[a] pattern
of specialization can be established as a result of accident or some initial difference in countries' resources,
then get locked in by the cumulative advantages that go with large scale." PAUL R. KRUGMAN,
RMErINKING INTERNATIONAL TRADE 6 (1990). This theory, sometimes called the "new theory of
international trade," is potentially important for trade policy because it implies that, under some
circumstances, government intervention in certain sectors is justifiable as enhancing national welfare. See
generally Paul Krugman, Strategic Sectors and International Competition, in 2 THE INTERNATIONAL
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TRADE 3-28 (David A. Lake ed., 1993) (discussing beneficial aspects of some
forms of protectionism). The primary authors of this new theory, however, are quick to emphasize its
descriptive, rather than prescriptive, value for three reasons. First, any implications for trade policy based
on the new theory depend critically on the particularities of individual markets. ELHANAN HELPMAN &
PAUL R. KRUGMAN, TRADE POLICY AND MARKET STRUCTURE 8 (1989). Second, "highly dubious"
political movements may use the theory for their own ends. Id. Last is the danger of "beggar-thy-
neighbor" policies, because those that "benefit one country acting unilaterally may be harmful if everyone
else does it." Id. at 8-9.
154. Part V develops this argument more fully.
155. Take, for example, France's participation in NATO and Germany's interest rate policies.
WILDMAN & SIWEK, supra note 28, at 64-65.
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in Spain, France, and the European Union suggest that these countries can
stand up to the United States.
B. Anticompetition Arguments
Proponents of a cultural exemption or specificity allowance in the GATT
also claim that these measures are necessary to protect nations against
anticompetitive practices employed by U.S. producers. This charge arises
most often in the context of film trade, where American firms allegedly use
their positions as dominant distributors to discriminate against foreign-
produced films.' 56
American film distribution clearly dominates both within the United States
and abroad. Few analysts would disagree that the "majors" are still the
dominant force in film production, financing, and distribution in the United
States and in many other areas of the world.'57 Before the 1948 U.S.
Supreme Court decision splitting the production and distribution of films away
from their exhibition, these studios were even more powerful.'
Commentators often use the Canadian film distribution sector as an
example of U.S. distribution power in foreign markets. As one notes, "[t]he
Canadian distribution sector is firmly in the hands of the large, integrated
U.S. production-distribution companies, which are members of a cartellike
trade association - the Motion Picture Export Association of America
(MPEAA). ""' A 1977 study showed that eight of the eighty-three
distribution companies operating in Canada took 77.8% of the total revenues
from film and videotape sales. 6 ' All eight were subsidiaries of U.S.
production-distribution firms.
The large vertically integrated U.S. distributing companies and their
affiliated circuits in Canada seem to keep the unintegrated, Canadian-owned
distribution and exhibition enterprises in an uncompetitive market
position.' 6 ' For example, between 1968 and 1978, Canada produced 448
156. Id. at 63; see also Paul Webster, Asterix versus the Dinosaurs, THE GUARDIAN, Sept. 17, 1993,
at 24 (noting that U.S. firms control most of French film distribution circuit).
157. David Gordon, Why the Movie Majors are Major, in THE AMERICAN FILM INDUSTRY, supra
note 137, at 459. The so-called "major studios" include Columbia Pictures, The Walt Disney Company,
MGM, Orion Pictures, Paramount Pictures, Tristar Pictures, Twentieth Century Fox, Universal Pictures,
and Warner Brothers. 1994 INT'L MPA, supra note 74, at 510-19.
.158. See United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131 (1948). Antitrust issues have played a
prominent role in the history and development of the U.S. film industry and probably foreshadow the
importance of antitrust law to the development of a workable international AN trade policy. See generally
Simon N. Whitney, Antitrust Policies and the Motion Picture Industry, in THE AMERICAN MOVIE
INDUSTRY, supra note 137, at 161-204 (discussing evolution of U.S. antitrust policy regarding film
industry and its impact on film producers, film exhibitors, and public).
159. Manjunath Pendakur, Cultural Dependency in Canada's Feature Film Industry, in THE
AMERICAN MOVIE INDUSTRY, supra note 137, at 352.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 356. Some say block and blind booking are additional practices that hinder Canadian
distributor companies' access to domestic theatrical markets. "In block booking, the exhibitor agrees to
buy a package of films which may consist of one or two potential box-office hits, and the rest second-rate
pictures. Blind booking is a policy of obtaining playdates whereby the theater operator has had no chance
to see the film because it may still be in production." Pendakur, supra note 159, at 356. The U.S.
Supreme Court declared block booking illegal under the Sherman Antitrust Act in Paramount Pictures,
334 U.S. at 156-57. Canada does not have such a precedent under its combine laws. Pendakur, supra note
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films, but, according to the Canadian Motion Picture Distributors Association,
only fourteen were distributed by the U.S. majors.' 62
American domination of a domestic distribution system such as Canada's
may initially appear peculiar. Control of distribution is a critical step not only
in bringing fim productions to exhibition, but also in maximizing profits in
an industry with unusually high financial risk. The importance and complexity
of distribution are, however, precisely the primary reasons for the
consolidation of control in distribution worldwide. '63 Dispersed control is
difficult because producing, financing, and distributing films are necessarily
linked.'"' First, film producers tend not to be sufficiently acquainted with
trends and changes in the preferences of the filmgoing public to judge the
potential profitability of films. Thus, they need to work closely with
distributors to decide what to produce and how to bring productions to the
market. Second, and perhaps most importantly, the film industry is vertically
integrated because distribution includes the risks of marketing as well as film
distribution. '65 Distributors need not only to exercise some control over
what they distribute, but also to spread the risks of distribution over many
different A/V products. In order to survive, they must set off the profits of
one production against the losses of another. This risk-spreading requires the
tremendous cash flow of the distributors. 66 Furthermore, distributors must
carefully coordinate the release of A/Vs to maximize profits. 
6 7
Third, the riskiness of A/V distribution renders it inherently expensive.
In 1976, for every $100 in cinema receipts, roughly $60 covered cinema costs
and profit; $15 covered the negative costs of the film; and the rest paid for
overhead and the profits of the distributor.' 68 Hence, distributors must have
an international sales organization in order to maximize film exhibition and
profits. One commentator analogized that "big time distribution is like the
steel industry; the costs of entry are very high." 1
69
The above factors provide a coherent explanation for the domination of
a few producers/distributors in the United States as well as in other countries.
They may even point to a tendency among film producer/distributors to utilize
questionable practices to minimize risk and maximize profits in a highly
volatile industry. The practices of Hollywood firms in the U.S. market
sparked decades of antitrust litigation; such dubious practices clearly deserve
investigation and may even warrant international regulation if they prove
otherwise unalterable.Nonetheless, the fact that some A/V firms may conduct business or trade
159, at 357.
162. Pendakur, supra note 159, at 357.
163. See, e.g., David Waterman, Prerecorded Home Video and the Distribution ofTheatrical Feature
Films, in VIDEO MEDIA COMPETITION: REGULATION, ECONOMICS, AND TECHNOLOGY, supra note 118,
at 221-43.
164. Gordon, supra note 157, at 460.
165. Waterman, supra note 163, at 229.
166. Gordon, supra note 157, at 463.
167. The importance of controlling release sequences goes back to the ability of AiV producers to
price discriminate. See NOAM, supra note 113, at 31.
168. Gordon, supra note 157, at 462.
169. Id.
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unfairly does not inherently merit exempting A/Vs from customary free trade
rules. Absent more concrete evidence, there is little reason to think that
national or international laws could not restrict unfair business practices in the
AN sector in the same way that domestic legislation or international
agreements restrict such practices in other sectors.
In any case, other considerations weaken any association between U.S.
distribution power and the large market shares that American A/Vs maintain
abroad. Namely, the international success of American A/V producers is
likely to be a function of the transnational appeal of their products. This
otherwise bald assertion seems credible in light of two observations. First,
even in some countries that do not permit U.S. ownership or control of
distribution, U.S. films still enjoy considerable success. 70  Second,
distribution by a major U.S. studio does not appear to increase appreciably the
box office appeal of foreign-language films in the United States. 17' The
economics of the film industry - including a lack of internationally
marketable products - arguably prevent non-American A/V distributors from
building a distribution network as powerful as that of American distributors.
In short, although distribution-power arguments highlight U.S. domination
and barriers to entry in film distribution, historical and economic factors seem
to mitigate the weight that can be accorded these arguments in the debate over
a cultural exemption or specificity allowance in the GATT. On the historical
side, the World Wars helped U.S. distributors gain a market share abroad that
they have continued to strengthen. Simultaneously, the ability to price
discriminate aided the export efforts of American A/V firms. The inherent
risk in film production and distribution encourages the control of distribution
systems by a few dominant players. Finally, the persistence of any
questionable business practices in distribution provides a strong argument for
placing A/V trade under the protective umbrage of multilateral agreements
such as the GATT. 72
C. Economic Explanation of Trade Advantages
Because the economic principle of comparative advantage forms the
foundation of free trade and the GATT, any analysis of A/V trade must
consider explanations of trade patterns in light of economic models. This
Section briefly describes the findings of one particular model - the
Wildman-Siwek model 73 - and assesses the model's relevance to
international A/V trade policy. Wildman and Siwek conclude that American
A/V producers enjoy what they term a "domestic opportunity advantage" over
other producers because of the large, wealthy, and mostly English-speaking
markets in the United States and other parts of the world. This Section argues
170. WILDMAN & SIWEK, supra note 28, at 65.
171. Id. at 24. Furthermore, economists do not clearly understand how U.S. producers/distributors
would profit from discriminating against foreign producers. Id. at 80-81 n. 10.
172. GATT members are currently considering an antitrust code. See International Antitrust Code
Will Be Studied by GA TlMembers, 10 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 35, at 1470 (Sept. 1, 1993).
173. See generally WILDMAN & SIWEK, supra note 28. This is the most recent and comprehensive
economic model of international A/V trade.
1995]
134 YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 20: 105
that those endorsing protectionist privileges must address serious questions of
fairness because the domestic opportunity advantage and other advantages
significantly favor large A/V producers.
1. Assumptions
The Wildman-Siwek model contains seven explicit assumptions, four of
which are fairly standard. 74 Wildman and Siwek added the three remaining
assumptions to help explain the relative magnitude of trade flows. The first
additional assumption states that, with other considerations being equal,
viewers prefer A/Vs in their native language.'75 In other words, translation
would diminish a film's appeal to an audience. The second new assumption
asserts a positive correlation between large budgets and the appeal of A/V
products.' 76 Finally, the model added the assumption that the market setting
forms the context for both production and consumption decisions. "
2. Model Results
Given the above assumptions, the Wildman-Siwek model shows that
"producers in larger countries, and producers in countries that belong to large
natural-language markets, have a financial incentive to create larger budget
films and programs that generally will have greater intrinsic audience appeal,
a clear advantage in international competition."'78 Wildman and Siwek refer
to this advantage as a "domestic opportunity advantage" ("DOA"). 79
While a thorough evaluation of this model is not possible here, a few
basic observations can be made to assess its relevance to international A/V
trade policy. Many of the model's strengths and weaknesses rest in its unique
assumptions. On the one hand, language probably explains, at least in part,
the success of American and other English-speaking producers in world
markets. The English-speaking A/V markets in the world are among the
largest and wealthiest. In addition, because such markets are large, they are
very diverse, even though English is the predominant language. Producers of
films in English probably have strong financial incentives to create and market
films that appeal to large and diverse audiences. In theory, A/V producers
from non-English-speaking countries have the same incentive. Their financial
incentive is usually outweighed, however, by the cost of producing quality
English language films that appeal to diverse audiences.' This
174. See id. at 67-68. The four standard assumptions merely describe conditions necessary for A/V
trade to occur and are attributed to work done earlier in Jorge Schement et al., The International Flow of
Television Programs, in COMMUNICATIONS RESEARCH at 163-82 (1984).
175. WILDMAN & SIWEK, supra note 28, at 68.
176. Id. Though their immediaterevenue sources may differ, the financial success of films, television




180. For French producers, making films in English rather than French would likely present serious
obstacles and therefore add substantial costs even though technology and human capital for film production
are increasingly mobile. The films, for example, would presumably have to be set in English-speaking
countries, and experts would have to be employed to resolve linguistic and other communications problems
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interpretation of A/V trade patterns suggests that, while the potential reward
in the world market is the same for all producers, not all producers are
equally endowed to compete for that reward.
Comparing the DOA to traditional notions of comparative advantage is
worthwhile because the DOA seems to view endowments as potentially
important determinants of A/V trade flows. The DOA does not fit snugly
within textbook notions of comparative advantage. It merely seems to describe
specific features of the world A/V consumption market that happen to favor
English-speaking producers. These features appear distinct from, for example,
the geographical and ambient factors that give the French a comparative
advantage in wine production. After all, the conventional understanding of
comparative advantages considers them to stem from differences in natural
resources or educational or industrial ability. In contrast, the DOA, while
giving advantages to certain producers, originates more from the consumption
side than from the production side of markets.
Regardless of its origins, the DOA, if it exists, nevertheless effectively
yields the same results as a comparative advantage for A/V producers in
countries where English is the dominant or native language. The DOA affects
the cost to film producers of making internationally successful films relative
to the cost of carrying out some other economic activity. Just as French
producers have historically derived a comparative advantage in wine-making
from geographical factors, American A/V producers may have gained what
amounts to a comparative advantage from global linguistic and economic
patterns.'' Similarly, American producers probably also derive a
"comparative advantage" in A/V production from the relatively rich cultural
diversity within the United States. Such diversity simultaneously prods and
helps U.S. producers develop A/V products with cross-cultural and therefore
transnational appeal." 2 In any case, the Wildman-Siwek model suggests that
certain A/V producers enjoy rather strong advantages in the A/V sector.
The unique assumptions behind the Wildman-Siwek model are
nevertheless vulnerable to criticism. First, modern technology and expertise
in dubbing lessen the importance of the assumption that viewers prefer A/Vs
in their native language over A/Vs in other languages. For example, .many
distributors in European countries dub English language films and programs
almost seamlessly. That U.S. films capture audience shares as high as eighty
percent in some European countries" 3 suggests strongly that this assumption
about language preferences may play a relatively unimportant role in
during the production and marketing of the films. More importantly, French script writers, producers, and
actors are unlikely to express themselves or their ideas as well in English. This difficulty of expression
would probably diminish the creativity and quality of the final product, and a poorly made English-
language film would not be competitive against well made films by U.S. producers.
181. The "economic pattern" here refers primarily to the comparatively wealthy English-speaking
markets around the world.
182. A truly open and international A/V market would tend to diminish any advantage U.S.
producers might derive from cultural diversity within the United States because nothing would prevent
internationally-minded producers from learning about each other's markets. Indeed, the United States'
advantage is arguably already diminishing. See, e.g., Nigel Andrews, Identity Crisis in the Euro-movies -
Nigel Andrews Explains Why It is Becoming More and More Difficult to Tell European and Hollywood
Filins Apart, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 18, 1993, at XVII ITarun: XVII or xvii?J.
183. WILDMAN & SIWEK, supra note 28, at 18-19 and Table 2-3.
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determining overall viewer demand.
Second, some relatively large-budget film productions fail while some
relatively small-budget films succeed."' These exceptions raise significant
doubts about the assumed positive correlation between the size of a film's
budget and what Wildman and Siwek term "inherent" audience appeal. The
success of some small-budget films supports the notion that creative talent and
production are vital elements in determining the box-office success of films.
The advantage of large film producers may thus be far from ironclad.
However, relaxing or rejecting either or both of these unique assumptions
would arguably only strengthen the assertion that American A/V producers
simply make more appealing films and programs and, as a result, dominate
A/V trade because they are more competitive.
In sum, the Wildman-Siwek model provides an economic explanation of
A/V trade patterns that conforms more or less to the available data and to
intuition. Of course, this model is not a complete explanation; like all models,
it is an imperfect interpretation of reality. If taken seriously, its findings
nevertheless provide analytical support to the fairness argument used by free
traders. The existing trade order seems to require us to exploit comparative
advantages in order to maintain our collective economic and political well-
being. To make an exception for the A/V sector would unfairly hinder those
traders with strong comparative advantages. Even more importantly, such an
exception could seriously weaken our mutual understanding of the conduct of
economic relations, which the GATT has strengthened considerably. Before
we risk that occurrence, we must find persuasive reasons to justify violating
basic principles like the exploitation of comparative advantages. The next
Section thus discusses cultural concerns and the extent to which they might
serve as good reasons to depart from a core trading principle.
V. CULTURAL AND OTHER "NON-ECONOMIC" CONCERNS
So far, this Article has focused on arguments that are used to support a
cultural exemption or specificity allowance in the GATT but which do not
implicate culture directly. This Part examines cultural and other non-economic
concerns explicitly and reaches three general conclusions. First, in many
markets, the prices of A/Vs may not fully reflect the value of cultural
integrity. Recognizing this incongruence is crucial because welfare
maximization occurs only when prices fully reflect all the costs and benefits
of an action to the society as a whole. Second, while this recognition may
indicate that cultural concerns are legitimate, those concerns do not
necessarily warrant trade barriers. National culture, the cultural content of
A/Vs, and the interaction between the two are so difficult to measure that
content regulation and restrictions based on the national origin of A/Vs
provide only dubious cultural benefits." Finally, the immensely beneficial
184. Consider, for example, the dismal failure of the expensively produced American film Last
Action Hero (Columbia Pictures 1993) and the success of the modestly budgeted film The Crying Game
(Miramax Films 1992), produced by an English film company.
185. This Section focuses on content regulation and regulations based on national origin because they
are the proposed means of protecting cultural integrity from A/V imports.
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role that informational flows have played in world development strongly
cautions against A/V import restrictions.
A. Cultural Concerns as Negative Externalities
Cultural arguments are typically very difficult to grasp because culture
can be an amorphous, if not subjective, idea. Borrowing the concept of
externalities from economic theory can aid in clarifying the analysis of these
cultural arguments. The use of this concept here is not an attempt to view
everything through an economic lens or to subordinate non-economic values
and concerns to efficiency; rather, the approach is an attempt to translate
those values and concerns into a more precisely defined concept. Using
externality analysis also reveals both weaknesses of free trade on its own
terms and the ultimate folly of a purely economic approach to the A/V
dispute.
Even those who believe on grounds of economic theory that A/Vs should
be freely traded cannot deny that trade in A/Vs, like trade in other goods and
services, may have externalities. Externalities occur when the market price of
a good or service does not reflect all the benefits and costs associated with its
production and consumption."8 6 Market failure can result and may justify
nonmarket allocation of these goods and services.
To see how externalities can lead to market failure, consider the case of
automobiles and pollution. Consumers acquire automobiles largely through the
market. As their numbers increase, however, automobiles cause familiar
negative externalities like the pollution of the atmosphere, increased traffic
congestion, and more accidents.8 7 Everyone, including the motorist, suffers
from greater pollution, delays in traffic, and the increased likelihood of
accidents. Yet, the market alone cannot force motorists to pay for these
"negative externalities." For example, a motorist could help reduce air
pollution by fitting a catalytic converter to his car, but that would cost him a
significant amount of money, and the enviromental benefits would be
imperceptible unless everybody else were to do the same thing. Thus,
unsurprisingly, nothing was done about the problem of smog in Los Angeles
until California and the federal government passed laws requiring every car
to be fitted with exhaust controls.'
Analogously, negative externalities can accompany trade in A/Vs. The
cultural integrity argument is essentially an externalities argument. As French
Prime Minister Edouard Balladur urged the National Assembly in October
1993, "[the French] cannot accept everything related to the fundamental
values of our tradition, our culture, our civilization [as] being treated like
ordinary traded goods."189 Similarly, speaking in support of a cultural
exemption in the GATT, French President Frangois Mitterand has contended
that "[w]liat is at stake, and therefore in peril, in the current negotiations is
186. A. KoursoYIANNIs, MODERN MICROECONOMICS 541 (2d ed. 1979).
187. This example is derived from the work of lain McLean. IAIN MCLEAN, PUBLIC CHOICE: AN
INTRODUCTION 21 (1987).
188. Id.
189. Sands, supra note 4, at B7.
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the right of each country to forge its imagination and to transmit to future
generations the representation of its own identity."190 Underlying the
rhetoric of both comments is the argument that free trade in A/Vs somehow
does not adequately account for certain social costs and benefits. Speaking in
more economic terms, the Premier and the President might have said that the
French lose certain valuable things - say, French sensibilities - from
exposure to American A/Vs that the prices of movie tickets, television
advertising, and video rentals do not capture. 9'
The argument that trade in A/Vs contains cultural externalities is
intuitively persuasive. For example, individual French viewers may not only
enjoy French film productions, but may also want the French movie industry
to increase the number of films it produces annually to encourage cinematic
expression of French sensibilities. 92 Individual viewers could increase French
film industry revenues by choosing to see French movies rather than those
produced in other countries. They probably would not limit themselves in that
way, however, because they also enjoy seeing movies made by non-French
producers. Seeing only French movies would cost much in terms of enjoyment
relative to the imperceptible benefit of helping the French movie industry.-'
As a result, many French cinemagoers may desire a stronger French film
industry but, for purely selfish reasons, may not be willing to sacrifice other
entertainment to pay for it.
The argument that significant externalities plague A/V trade may be even
stronger in the context of developing countries. For instance, if the economic
elite of a developing country watch Dallas or another U.S. television show
that portrays lavish lifestyles, they may develop aspirations or expectations
that reduce the amount that they are willing to sacrifice for indigenous
development or other important national goals. 94 Such externalities seem
especially likely to exist when U.S. producers can price discriminate in selling
A/Vs abroad. The cheaper the prices are, the less accurately they reflect the
true social cost of exhibiting those films and television programs in a less
developed country. 95
190. Port Louis, MItterand Denounces U.S. Domination at Francophone Summit, AGENCE FRANCE
PRESsE, Oct. 16, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library.
191. Peter Passell, Is France's Cultural Protection a Handy-Dandy Trade Excuse?, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan.
6, 1994, at D2.
192. Assume for the moment that the content of French culture or sensibilities is identifiable. For
a discussion of the validity of cultural assumptions, see infra Part V.B.
193. However, a rational movie consumer might be willing to increase her consumption of French
movies or to pay higher taxes to subsidize the French film industry if she thought others were willing to
take the same actions.
194. ALAN WELLS, PICTURE-TUBE IMPERIALISM? 121 (1972). Identifying and measuring the
relationship between A/Vs and cultures is an extremely difficult and controversial enterprise. The absence
of mutually agreeable reference points and the complexity of establishing causation, for example, make
it very difficult to draw precise conclusions about the impact of A/Vs on culture and vice-versa. See, e.g.,
TAMAR LiEBES & ELHU KATZ, THE EXPORT OF MEANING (1990). While this Article does not seek to
prove any specific relationship between A/Vs and culture, it does assume that A/Vs impact cultural
development.
195. A/V trade can have positive as well as negative externalities. Developing countries can plausibly
derive social benefits from cheap, imported A/V products that outweigh the social costs of the imports both
in terms of price and negative externalities.
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B. The Difficulty of Defining and Applying Cultural Standards
Externalities can sometimes justify government intervention, as in the case
of cars and pollution. In the case of A/V trade, however, government import
restrictions are not desirable. On the one hand, concerns about cultural
integrity are legitimate in many countries because A/V purchases by
individuals do not accurately account for them. On the other hand, little
suggests that content regulation or restriction of A/V imports based on
national origin can reasonably address these cultural concerns. Furthermore,
the harm such regulation poses to international trade norms greatly outweighs
the marginal benefit, if any, that such regulation affords cultural integrity.
As argued above, prices under a free trade regime may not fully reflect
the value of cultural integrity to consumers. Cultural integrity, like air quality,
is something consumers are unlikely to pay for even though they want it.
Price discrimination in A/Vs further decreases the ability of prices to account
for cultural integrity values. Thus, under a free trade regime, countries can
in theory legitimately voice concerns about cultural integrity.
However, content regulation or regulation of A/Vs by national origin have
serious shortcomings if their purpose is to reflect the value private individuals
place on cultural integrity. The difficulty of identifying and defining the
relevant culture presents the first obstacle.'96 Governments can declare with
confidence that "[tihe audiovisual sector is of great importance to the cultural
identity of peoples, regions and nations, ""' 7 and few would dispute their
claim. Films, news and entertainment programs, and video documentaries
have already shaped societies and will continue to do so.9's People can also
legitimately note that A/Vs are not like refrigerators or cars because they have
strong public good characteristics; their value lies in their informational rather
than their functional content.
Nevertheless, to conclude from those two claims that governments should
be able to regulate A/V trade presupposes that government regulation is a
better alternative than no regulation. Regulating culture is not like regulating
refrigerators or cars. Unlike the content of most goods, the content of culture
is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to identify in a reasonable way. In
terms of meaning, "[clulture is one of the two or three most complicated
words in the English language."' 99 A reasonable definition might be that
culture "consists of knowledge, beliefs, perceptions, attitudes, expectations,
values, and patterns of behavior that people learn by growing up in a given
196. Any measure purporting to regulate culture must do at least three things reasonably well. First,
it must define and identify the culture to be protected. Second, it must identify the cultural content of the
relevant A/V product. Third, it must show that the impact of viewing the AV product would probably
compromise the viewer's sense of cultural integrity in a way that would exceed any benefits the viewer
might receive. Domestic content rules with respect to manufactured goods have been troublesome under
the GATT. See JACKSON, WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 18, at 191. Therefore, one can easily
surmise that cultural content rules would pose even greater problems.
197. Collins, supra note 11, at 361 (quoting Eur. Parl. Doc. (A2-0347/88) 8 (1989)).
198. See, e.g., CULTURE, SOCIETY AND THE MEDIA (Michael Gurevitch et al. eds., 1982); JOHN
FISKE, TELEVISION CULTURE (1987); CONRAD PHILLIP KOTTAK, PRIME-TIME SOCIETY (1990).
199. Collins, supra note 11, at 363 (emphasis in original) (quoting RAYMOND WILLIAMS,
KEYWORDS: A VOCABULARY OF CULTURE AND SOCIETY 76 (1976)).
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society."2' This definition, however, only breaks up the metaphysical
concept of culture into other concepts with their own metaphysical difficulties.
Even if one could reasonably delineate a particular culture at a given
time, much of its content would not be purely indigenous in origin. For
example, French culture includes a number of imported elements. Part of the
Louvre was designed by I.M. Pei, a Chinese American. Many French wine
grapes grow on root stocks that originally came from California, while the
towers of Neuilly and Montparnasse were designed in Chicago.2"'
Furthermore, many French voters cast their ballots for parties whose
platforms originated from foreign thinkers like Marx or Lenin. 02 Even
popular sports in France, such as soccer and tennis, are imported. Like
French culture, almost all other cultures are to a significant degree
cross-cultural. Indeed, cultural affinities certainly account to an appreciable
extent for the popularity of U.S. films and television programs abroad.
Finally, many cultures can be delineated in ways that bear little
relationship to national boundaries. The existence of a "proletarian culture,"
"youth culture," and now even "mass culture" demonstrates some of the
common ways in which culture can be defined to defy sovereign
boundaries. 3 The similarity of interests (classical music, tuxedos, French
wine, golf, etc.) among the elite of different countries suggests that "high
culture" too has for some time been transnational. Moreover, distinct cultures
that define different ethnic groups thrive in more than one country. In sum,
national boundaries do not necessarily correspond to cultural boundaries.
The problems of definition, origination, and boundaries noted above make
arbitrary any governmental trade measure aiming at cultural specificity. The
1989 European Community Broadcast Directive2" serves as an excellent
example. While the Directive ostensibly seeks to protect European culture, the
criteria used to define "European works" focus primarily on the location of
production companies and the residences of their workers. 205 As one
commentator observed, "under this definition, an episode of Dallas filmed in
Paris with European actors and producers would qualify as a European work,
while a drama on the French Revolution filmed in Paris with American actors
and producers presumably would not."206 The EU Directive also assumes
without adequate reason that EU member states are somehow culturally more
similar to each other than to nonmember states. It is hardly clear, for
example, that the United Kingdom has more in common culturally with Italy
than with the United States.20 7 In fact, if the assumption of cultural
200. This is the standard anthropological definition. KOTTAK, supra note 198, at 5.
201. ITHIEL DE SOLA POOL, TECHNOLOGIES WITHOUT BOUNDARIES 131 (Eli M. Noam ed., 1990).
202. See id.
203. NOAM, supra note 113, at 23.
204. Directive, supra note 11.
205. See id. at 27. For an excellent treatment of the problems with the "European works" criteria
under the Directive, see Filipek, supra note 11.
206. Filipek, supra note 11, at 358 (citation omitted).
207. If a common culture exists in Europe, it is similar to U.S. culture because the United States has
absorbed and assimilated many European cultural influences. NOAM, supra note 113, at 24. This reasoning
suggests that the European Union may be trying to create, rather than to protect, a common culture in
Europe through such measures as the broadcast Directive. Recognizing this possible motive introduces
another important variable - the role of governments - into the analysis of cultural concerns. See infra
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commonality in Europe were true, an A/V market larger than that of the
American market would presumably be more favorable to EU producers
rather than American A/V producers.
In addition, the globalization of film production renders import
restrictions based on national origin increasingly problematic. For example,
foreign investors now control four of the largest seven American film
production companies."' Today, A/V production companies of different
nationalities also co-produce more films and programs and even integrate
operations." ° Individuals of different nationalities commonly direct, write
scripts for, and otherwise significantly contribute to the creation of films
produced or financed by companies of still different nationalities.21 0 This
growth of multinational film companies and production efforts greatly reduces
the ability of the nationality of the producer or actors or the location of
production to serve as reasonable proxies for culture.
Finally, given the difficulties presented above, an individual or
government could not reasonably assign monetary or other concrete measures
of value to any cultural externalities present in A/V trade. Without some
reasonable means of assessing such values, government bureaucracies
formulating import restrictions can only rely on the kind of cultural
speculation illustrated above. Regulation experts have in fact long recognized
that the less susceptible objectives are to monetary estimation, the less useful
externality-type characterizations are to policy formation.2 '
In short, it is tempting to conclude that cultural externalities in A/V trade
necessitate government intervention. However, externality-type arguments can
also be used too readily to justify measures that lead to outcomes the market
would not sanction. As demonstrated above, content regulation and regulation
of A/Vs on the basis of national origin are so arbitrary that they probably do
not further the ends they seek. Seen in this light, the "cultural benefits" of
A/V import restrictions appear illusory at best.
C. Other "Non-Economic" Norms
As the preceding Section demonstrates, accepting that A/V trade can have
negative cultural externalities does not compel approval of content regulation
or regulation based on national origin. It nevertheless reinforces a fact that
few can dispute: A/V trade does challenge the integrity of cultures, regardless
of their precise content or boundaries. In fact, all international
part V.C.
208. For example, Sony now owns Columbia Pictures Entertainment Inc., and Matsushita Electrical
Industrial Co. owns MCA, Inc. Audiovisual Report Examines Measuresfor Shoring Up European Industry,
II Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 15, at 589 (Apr. 13, 1994). In addition, a state-controlled French bank,
Credit Lyonnais, owns MGM Studios. Alice Rawsthorn, MGM Cinemas Back in Spotlight - Credit
Lyonnais is Casting for the Role of Buyer, FIN. TIMES, January 7, 1995, at 10.
209. For example, NBC has invested in Super Channel, a pan-European cable network, and Home
Box Office and Canal-Plus are collaborating on a project to produce pay-per-view TV service in Turkey.
Bailey Morris, Tinsel Town Eyes Europe's Glitter, THE INDEPENDENT, Dec. 19, 1993, at 4.
210. The Piano and Terminator 2, for instance, were financed in part by the French concerns Ciby
2000 and Studio Canal-Plus, respectively. Roger Cohen, Aux Arues! France Rallies to Battle Sly and T
Rex, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 2, 1994, at B1.
211. STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 26 (1982).
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communications challenge the integrity of established cultures. Such
communications "obliterate many of the impediments that served in the past
to slow down changes in ideas and mores. Barriers of time and space that
once protected the status quo are easily penetrated or circumvented by modern
media. "
2 12
As a result, the issue of whether to allow a cultural exemption or
specificity in the GATT does not rest solely on the mechanical evaluation of
externalities in the framework of market economics; it also implicates other
normative values regarding the development processes of peoples around the
world. The remainder of this portion of the Article argues that focusing on
such normative values has at least three advantages for resolving the GATT
dispute over A/Vs, the first two of which were indirectly discussed above.
First, this focus recognizes that trade in A/Vs is not purely a positive
economic issue. Formulating international A/V trade policy requires
discussion of normative values other than the value of free market economics.
At the same time, however, the issue of trade in A/Vs is not simply a
"cultural issue" that can fairly be reduced to relativism. To do so encourages
the arbitrary use of sovereignty as a means of settling international disputes.
Finally and most practically, looking to values premised on larger issues of
world development can help identify values that are not exclusively rooted in
either free market economics or cultural relativism, but on which many
countries can generally agree.
1. The Mass Media Revolution, World Development, and Sovereignty
Among the various normative values that might inform the A/V dispute,
one arguably commands special attention: the role of mass media and
information flows in political, economic, and social development. As this
Section demonstrates, notions of cultural protection based on sovereignty are
not inevitably benign. In fact, such notions represent the predictable and
continuing tendency of nation-states to undervalue the benefits of unrestricted
information flows. Recognition of this tendency and its negative impact on
society as a whole strongly cautions against the adoption or continuance of
culture-specific import restrictions in A/V trade.
Mass media began with the invention of the printing press in Asia in the
15th century A.D. Some of the more obviously beneficial changes that
resulted include the emergence of modern languages, improved legal systems,
and the tremendous growth in science." 3 Other developments of great
212. Ithiel de Sola Pool, Direct Broadcast Satellites and the Integrity of National Cultures, in
NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY AND INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION 120, 123 (Kaarle Nordenstreng &
Herbert 1. Schiller eds., 1979) [hereinafter Pool, Integrity of National Cultures]. The accuracy of this
statement increases with the intervention and use of new technologies such as the direct broadcast satellite.
See, e.g., Sharon L. Fjordbak, The International Direct Broadcast Satellite Controversy, 55 J. AIR L. &
COM. 903 (1990); Eric Schine, The Little Dish That Could... ?, Bus. WEEK, Apr. 4, 1994, at 43.
213. See Elizabeth Eisenstein, Some Conjectures about the Impact of Printing on Western Society
and Thought: A Preliminary Report, 40 J. MOD. HIST. 1, 1-56 (1968) ihereinafter Eisenstein,
Conjectures]. See generally ELIZABETH EISENSTEIN, THE PRINTING PRESS AS AN AGENT OF CHANGE
(1979) (surveying contribution to social change made by evolution from script to print).
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historical importance, such as the rise of Protestantism2 14 and the separation
of the sacred from the secular, 2 also stemmed from the advent of the
printed word.
Still other noteworthy developments were arguably more negative. For
example, the "heresies" that proliferated from printshops prompted the
introduction of censorship. Censorship, in turn, led many countries to restrict
their domestic printing industries. Britain, as a result, became dependent on
the Dutch for printing devices because its own publishers left the country for
others that were free from censorship.216
In short, the advent of the printing press commodified information in the
form of the printed word and, in doing so, intertwined people of all
nationalities. The printing press and the books, pamphlets, and leaflets it
spawned were in retrospect significant contributions to mankind's progress.
The ultimate contribution of the printing press, however, is not the only
relevant observation. What is also relevant is the way - the predictable way
- in which social organizations, such as governments and religious
institutions, reacted to the advent of mass media. Governments and religious
organizations justified restricting the printed word essentially on grounds of
political and religious sovereignty. Their reaction was predictable because the
printing press created new conduits of information or belief in the form of
books, pamphlets, and the like, that operated as "counterweights to the
established authorities. "217 Thus, censorship and other domestic restrictions
rapidly followed the mass utilization of the printing press.
Governments and religious organizations are not the only entities whose
"authority" is challenged by the mass media. These organizations often
depend on support from the adherents of specific traditions of a nation's
culture, whose authority is also challenged. In India, for example, the All
India Radio has established quotas on movie themes, a favorite program item,
"to preserve traditional musical forms."218
Consequently, "sovereignty" invoked as a basis for restricting the flow
of culture and information does not represent a monolithic interest. Rather,
it aggregates and distorts the individual interests in a "panoply of overlapping
viewpoints" that have in common only the belief that free or freer flows of
culture are detrimental to their entrenched interests. 29 These interests
include those of film companies subsidized or otherwise protected under both
present and contemplated government regulations; producers, directors, and
actors whose work and ideas politicians and government officials favor; and
even government agencies, officials, political parties, and politicians whose
power depends on the ability to regulate the so-called cultural industries. They
214. See James Curran, Conmnunications, Power, and Social Order, in CULTURE, SOCIETY, AND
THE MEDIA, supra note 198, at 202, 219-20; Eisenstein, Conjectures, supra note 213, at 45.
215. With the appearance of printed media, church sermons were no longer a major source of
reporting community news. Church services became more purely religious in nature, making the distinction
between the sacred and secular more clear and meaningful. Eisenstein, Conjectures, supra note 213, at
41-43.
216. POOL, TECHNOLOGIES WITHOUT BOUNDARIES, supra note 201, at 5.
217. Pool, Integrity of National Cultures, supra note 212, at 124.
218. Id. at 125.
219. POOL, TECHNOLOGIES WITHOUT BOUNDARIES, supra note 201, at 115.
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also include the interests of people who seek to create or to strengthen a
particular kind of culture for ideological or other advantage - for example,
people who have unfounded prejudices against other countries, or political
leaders who can garner support by trumpeting "sovereignty" to restrict A/V
imports .22
The point of the above analysis is threefold. First, it sets out the myriad
of interests that march under the banner of cultural sovereignty. Like slogans,
the terms "cultural integrity" and "cultural preservation" are intellectually
convenient and politically expedient. Second, many of those interests are ones
that the international community does not or should not encourage. Many of
them are classic economic protectionist arguments that are disapproved in
other trade sectors; others simply do not deserve recognition because they
foster invidious international discrimination. Any remaining benign interests
would still confront the problems of arbitrariness discussed earlier.
More importantly, the above analysis serves as a powerful reminder that
there are good reasons and notable international precedents for looking behind
the curtain of sovereignty to enhance our collective well-being. International
human rights, for example, limit the ability of governments to act in certain
ways against their people. The GATT, too, limits national sovereignty by
committing its signatories to the liberalization of trade in goods. In fact,
nations have formally recognized the value of the free flow of information,
which stems from the right of all people to freely receive and communicate
information."' Commentators have labelled this formalization the "doctrine
of the international free flow of information." Although the doctrine's legal
binding power upon nations is somewhat controversial, 2 the reasons behind
the doctrine are clear: nations understand the importance of the free flow of
information to increased mutual understanding, peace, and the stability of
foreign relations.
2. Perspectives on Sovereignty and Cultural Integrity
The value of mass media and information flows to peaceful, rapid
development lessens the desirability of a cultural exemption or specificity
allowance in the GATT. Besides permitting regulations that would confer
dubious cultural benefits, such an exemption or allowance would invite
excessive nationalism, arbitrary regionalism, and cultural rigidification, all of
which tend to undervalue the mutual benefits of unrestricted informational and
220. Indeed, as the political writer Jean-Louis Draze comments, "[Prime Minister] Balladur is
portrayed as the man who saved French culture from destruction by the Americans.... He and his
supporters aren't about to stop beating that particular drum. The nearer the presidential election
approaches, the louder they'll beat it." Bernard Kaplan, France Extends Its Cultural Crusade to American
Rock'n'Roll, THE GAzETTE (Montreal), Dec. 24, 1993, at D16.
221. The principal treaties include the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 19, G.A. Res.
217A, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 19, G.A. Res.
2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 55, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966); Helsinki Accords
(Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Final Act), DEP'T ST. BULL., Sept. 1975, at 323,
341-42 (1975).
222. For a thorough discussion of the applicability of the doctrine of free flow of information to
broadcasting, see Vincent B. Feher, "Television Without Frontiers%- Possible U.S. Responses, 9 U. MIAMI
ENr. & SPORTS L. REV. 65, 104-18 (1992).
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cultural flows.
The argument that nations should collectively guard against such
propensities seems particularly persuasive considering the inherent resilience
of cultures. The marketplace for ideas naturally favors local products. Locally
produced A/Vs, for example, have many advantages that foreign imports must
overcome.' First, language and other interpretation barriers protect
them. 4 As mentioned above, people probably prefer watching a film in
their own language than one with subtitles or one that is dubbed. Second,
barriers of social support also protect local A/Vs. Much of the enjoyment and
satisfaction of watching films, for instance, lies in discussing them with family
and friends. Third, local A/Vs are further protected by barriers of what we
conventionally call "culture." Domestic A/Vs portray characters eating foods
the local people eat and wearing clothes they wear. As a Japanese delegate to
the GATT aptly remarked, Japan brings in many foreign products and
influences and turns them into something uniquely Japanese: "[i]n Japan
culture is considered to be something with many layers."'
In short, while cultural concerns may to some extent be legitimate, the
invocation of sovereignty alone appears unpersuasive as a basis for cultural
protectionism. Political boundaries are poor proxies for overlapping and
amorphous cultural spheres. Furthermore, the international community
disapproves of many of the often arbitrary interests that fuel national
movements for cultural sovereignty. Notions of cultural integrity based on
political sovereignty thus tend to underrate the advantages of unrestricted
informational flows to development and foreign relations.
VI. DIRECTIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL A/V TRADE POLICY
This Article does not pretend to survey and evaluate all the different
issues that the A/V dispute implicates. It does, however, try to build a
framework in which the most important arguments can be contrasted,
compared, and then assimilated for trade policy purposes. The previous Parts
of this Article have discussed the main arguments found in the A/V debate;
this Part assimilates them in the hope of developing broad policy directions
for A/V trade.
A. Competing Faiths
In some ways, the free trade versus cultural protection debate boils down
to competing faiths. The free traders rely largely on faith in competition
because the public good aspects of A/Vs make it difficult to obtain clear
statements about the efficiency of different A/V allocation structures. Cultural
223. These advantages are adapted from Pool, Integrity of National Cultures, supra note 212, at 142.
224. One study researched the interpretation of the popular television series Dallas in different
countries. The authors of the study concluded that while a program like Dallas may beam a homogeneous
message to its international audience, viewers often interpret the message differently. LIEBES & KATZ,
supra note 194, at 152.
225. Debate Over EC's Attempt to Exclude Audiovisual Sectorfrom GA TS Continues, 10 Int'l Trade
Rep. (BNA) No. 38, at 1628 (Sept. 29, 1993) (quoting Akihiko Soyama).
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protectionists thus have good reasons to worry about price discrimination and
dumping behavior in A/V markets. Moreover, cultural goods can have hidden
social costs and benefits (the externalities discussed above) that market
transactions do not fully reflect.
The conviction of cultural protectionists similarly stems from faith in
amorphous notions of culture. These ideas are exceedingly hard to define with
reasonable precision and involve intractable questions such as how cultures are
precisely reflected in and impacted by A/Vs. Notions of national culture are
also arbitrary. Cultural boundaries, even if precisely defined, do not always
correspond to political boundaries. Free traders thus correctly worry about a
trading system that arbitrarily discriminates against A/V producers under the
cover of cultural protection.
B. Common Faith
To view the A/V dispute in terms of competing faiths alone, however,
would be to see the trees and miss the forest. The A/V sector is only one of
many spheres in which countries interact. In this broader context the GATT,
as an institution of common faith, gives valuable guidance to the A/V dispute.
Regardless of their positions on the narrow issue of A/V trade, the
contracting parties of the GATT share a belief in the premises behind the
regime. As discussed in Part II, those premises are that international trade is
beneficial; that self-interested national economic policies contribute to
misunderstanding, instability, and war in international relations; and that
international agreement on trade policy is useful, if not necessary, because
national actions to promote trade and stability will usually be frustrated by the
actions of other states.226
To be sure, the common faith of the CPs has clear limits. Few believe,
for instance, that the framers of the GATT meant for markets eventually to
replace governments. Similarly, under the analysis in this paper, one possible
limitation to the GATT common faith is the treatment of trade in quasi-public
goods. Trade in these goods, like films, television programs, videotapes,
books, music tapes, and CDs, does not seem to fit conveniently within our
conventional understanding of trade. Another possible limitation concerns the
desirability of regulating "cultural trade" because of its impact on national
cultures.
Although the problems that quasi-public goods pose for free trade are not
insignificant, they do not appear so large when one considers the alternative
to free trade. No one can know with reasonable certainty whether particular
import restrictions would lead to a more efficient allocation of A/Vs than
would no regulation at all. As the Section on mass media and information
flows shows, if permitted to restrict A/V trade, governments are in fact likely
to significantly undervalue the informational benefits of A/V trade. The
226. See supra part II. Reasonable people can, of course, disagree on the exact formulation of the
premises behind the GATT. Professor Jackson's formulation is used here only to show that even a very
modest formulation demonstrates that sanctioning AN import restrictions would severely undermine the
existing world trading order.
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concern over cultural integrity is easy to overstate as well: cultural concerns
may be legitimate, but, as shown above, basing import restrictions on notions
of national cultural integrity simply does not hold up under rational scrutiny.
If the analysis were to end here, choosing to disallow A/V import quotas
could be justified, although not comfortably. One further observation,
however, swings the pendulum distinctly in favor of unrestricted trade despite
the public good aspects of A/Vs. If the GATT premises are to hold, A/V
trade restrictions should not be allowed, if only because they are arbitrary and
unfair. To reiterate, notions of national cultural integrity - however they are
formulated - do not hold up under rational scrutiny. Furthermore, the import
restrictions to which they give rise deny the full benefits to traders with
comparative advantages in the A/V sector. Not surprisingly, trade restrictions
based on notions of cultural integrity have in fact already spawned precisely
those problems that the GATT seeks to avoid: threatened reductions in
international A/V trade, misuderstanding, and lack of international agreement.
These problems would arise even if A/V import restrictions were justified on
the grounds of their public good aspects. Economists could not devise import
restrictions that would reasonably address distortions caused by the public
good aspects of A/Vs. Even if they could, governments are rarely the puppets
of benign economists. Granting the privilege to restrict A/V imports would
merely invite its abuse.
The arbitrariness of content regulation or regulation based on national
origin is pivotal in the analysis because of the role that governments play in
trade relations. The integrity of the GATT relies implicitly but critically on
the idea that government should not act arbitrarily. Without this idea, none of
the. premises behind the GATT could survive. Allowing governments to use
A/V import restrictions would thus severely undermine the GATT because
any such government restrictions would clearly be arbitrary and unfair.
Sanctioning them would set a dangerous precedent for the entire trading
system. Arguably, unrestricted trade in A/Vs is preferable, not because it
leads to a superior allocation of A/Vs in the world, but because it guards
against arbitrary national or regional trade policies. Permitting governments
to discriminate against particular A/V imports would undermine the basic
premises of an existing world trade order whose concern goes well beyond the
A/V sector.
C. The Role of Protective Provisions in the GAIT
Rejection of a cultural exemption or specificity allowance would
admittedly pose some doctrinal problems for the GATT. Namely, one possible
interpretation of Article IV holds that it codifies cultural sovereignty as a
legitimate exception to GATT principles. There are at least two responses to
this problem. First, CPs could eliminate Article IV by amendment. An
amendment may not be necessary, however, if it can be proven that screen
quotas are in practice ineffective at restricting film trade flows. More
practically, CPs can simply interpret Article IV literally, thereby confining the
exception to the use of screen quotas for cinema films. In this manner, the
GATT's principles could encompass all other A/Vs.
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Eliminating or disarming Article IV does not mean that CPs would have
no way of protecting their culture or cultural industries. The debate over A/Vs
often overlooks the fact that the current GATT already provides means of
achieving some protection. For example, Article XIX, popularly known as the
"Escape Clause," allows a CP temporarily to suspend GATT obligations for
the protection of domestic industries suffering from a decline in international
competitiveness. 7 If countries want to strengthen or rebuild their cultural
industries, they should invoke this provision rather than some general notion
of "cultural sovereignty." The international community could then more
concretely assess and agree upon the reasonableness of departures from core
GATT principles.
In addition, Article XX permits the use of quotas or other trade
restrictions to the extent they are "necessary to protect public morals." 28
Under the GATT, countries can legitimately restrict the import of A/Vs, such
as pornographic films, if they deem the restriction necessary for the moral
protection of their citizens. As further evidence that GATT CPs have
committed themselves to rational, nonarbitrary trade policies, however,
Article XX states that use of the listed "general exceptions" are "subject to
the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would
constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between
countries. "'
D. Incorporating A/Vs into the GA77
The GATT offers an attractive framework for ensuring that A/Vs are
traded freely and without restrictions. Its principles of MFN and national
treatment, among others, have proven extremely helpful in reducing
international commercial discrimination, and the international community
largely accepts them.
Incorporating the A/V sector into the GATT regime nonetheless raises
some additional issues that are beyond the scope of this Article. 0 The
problem of widespread A/V piracy, for example, causes some to question
whether unconditional MFN should be the short-term goal of GATT
members2 3 ' Because of the importance to A/V producers of controlling
distribution within national markets, variations on the principle of national
227. To be invoked, Article XIX requires increased import quantities that have resulted from
"unforeseen developments" and that "cause or threaten serious injury to domestic producers ... of like
or directly competitive products." GATT, supra note 13, art. XIX. See generally KENNETH DAM, THE
GATT: LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 99-107 (1970) (discussing operation of
Escape Clause actions); JACKSON, WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 12, at 556-73 (same).
228. GATT, supra note 13, art. XX.
229. Id. Although Article XX does not define what constitutes arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination, it clearly recognizes and seeks to limit potential abuses by CPs.
230. This Article does not argue that A/Vs should be classified as goods or services for the purposes
of incorporating them into the GATT regime; instead, it argues that ANV trade should follow rules similar
to those that promote free trade in goods. Certain characteristics of A/Vs may, however, make variations
on the GATT's nondiscrimination principles desirable. Consequently, an agreement on the A/V sector
would probably fall under the GATS, which is more flexible than the GATT.
231. See WILDMAN & SPwEK, supra note 28, at 157.
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treatment and the right of establishment may also prove desirable. 2
Furthermore, GATT members may want to permit governments to subsidize
domestic A/V producers as a rough compromise between market and cultural
concerns. 3 If necessary, CPs could even adopt a sector-specific agreement
that addresses these and other peculiarities of the A/V industry but that does
not sanction import restrictions.
VII. CONCLUSION
This Article provides some order to the various arguments advanced in-
the AN trade dispute, though it is far from a definitive study or a
comprehensive approach to the problems that A/Vs pose for international
trade policy. If the analysis here proves anything, it shows that the A/V
dispute implicates a diverse range of issues, from trade theory and law to
communications and the social sciences. This breadth presents both challenges
and dangers for the GATT.
The challenges are of the kind that GATT members will increasingly have
to face as they try to reap the benefits of a more liberal and globalized
economy. Thus, the difficulties that the public good characteristics of A/Vs
present need greater attention. Price discrimination by A/V suppliers has
understandably resulted in questions about pricing and about the application
of traditional competition theory to A/V trade in general. The importance of
the goods/services distinction for international trade policy also deserves
reconsideration in light of the growing importance of trade in items that are
not easily classified as either. Furthermore, as the dispute perhaps best
demonstrates, GATT members should be wary not only of the limitations of
free trade in achieving certain goals, but also of the clash between free trade
and other values. Concerns about the effect of free trade on cultural integrity
are not simply cover for economic protectionism; they are real and legitimate.
The A/V dispute, however, also presents dangers for the GATT and the
existing world trade order. While the novel challenges of AN trade help us
to refine our understanding of trade relations, they simultaneously invite
distortion of that understanding. As this Article demonstrates, cultural
concerns are legitimate to some extent, but the import restriction privileges
that many countries are attempting to legitimize within the GATT do not
reasonably address those concerns. Political boundaries and cultural
boundaries simply do not correspond in a way that permits rational and
meaningful import discrimination, and a benign privilege that can only be
exercised arbitrarily merely invites governmental abuse.
The rejection of a cultural exemption in the GATT does not mean that
A/Vs should be treated exactly like conventional goods and services. Their
unique economic qualities may call for some special treatment. Any special
232. See id. at 159.
233. See, e.g., SMITH, GEOPOLIICS, supra note 127, at 135-37. Under the analysis in this Article,
however, governments should perhaps not be allowed to subsidize A/V producers. First, governments are
not obviously better than the market in determining what ought to be produced. Second, absent persuasive
reasons to the contrary, subsidies in the A/V sector should be discouraged for the same well-known
reasons they are discouraged in other sectors.
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treatment, however, should not be premised on cultural concerns because it
would provide dubious cultural benefits at the expense of undermining the
GATT. The idea that national governments should not create arbitrary
discriminatory trade policies underlies the very benefits of a liberal trade
order and the commitment of GATT members to each other. Although cultural
concerns may be legitimate, GATT members should resist the call for a
cultural exemption and refuse to sanction A/V import quotas.
